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Abstract
This paper studies the implications of opacity in financial markets for in-
vestor behavior, asset prices, and welfare. Transparent funds (e.g., mutual
funds) and opaque funds (e.g., hedge funds) trade transparent assets (e.g.,
plain-vanilla products) and opaque assets (e.g., structured products). In-
vestors observe neither opaque funds’ portfolios nor opaque assets’ payoffs.
Consistent with empirical observations, an “opacity price premium” arises:
opaque assets trade at a premium over transparent ones despite identical
payoffs. This accompanies endogenous market segmentation: transparent
(opaque) funds trade only transparent (opaque) assets. The opacity price
premium incentivizes financial engineers to render transparent assets opaque
deliberately. (JEL D80, G10, G23)
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Opacity is central to modern finance. Opaque investment companies, such as hedge
funds—typically with secretive investment strategies and undisclosed holdings—have rapidly
grown in size and seem to have played a major role in the markets.1 Moreover, the
importance of opaque and complex financial assets, such as sophisticated structured
products—whose payoff information is incomprehensible and/or inaccessible to most retail
investors—was highlighted during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Despite its importance,
however, the implications of opacity in financial markets are not fully understood. How
does opacity affect investor behavior, asset prices, and welfare?
In terms of asset prices, an intriguing empirical fact is that opaque and complex
assets have been traded at a premium, rather than at a discount. Coval, Jurek, and
Stafford (2009) find that senior collateralized debt obligation tranches were significantly
overpriced before 2007. Henderson and Pearson (2011) report that a retail structured
equity product’s price is almost 8% greater than its fair value. Ce´le´rier and Valle´e (2013)
find that structured products are traded at a premium in Europe; the more complex a
product, the more pronounced its overpricing.2 These observations are puzzling: they
appear to be inconsistent with standard asset-pricing models with rational agents. Such
models might predict that investors unable to comprehend the nature of an asset would
require a discount on the price, rather than pay a premium. Why do opaque assets trade
at a premium? More fundamentally, why do opaque assets emerge in the first place?
To answer these questions, this paper develops a fully rational, dynamic asset-market
equilibrium model with portfolio delegation. More specifically, I consider a discrete time
model with infinite horizon. Its baseline version has one risky asset and one riskless
asset. The risky asset’s periodic payoff is the sum of a persistent component and a
transitory component, both stochastic and unobservable. Over time, agents learn about
the persistent component, based on the payoff history. There is a continuum of investment
funds, each with one fund manager and a number of investors. The investors can invest
directly in the riskless asset. However, investing in the risky asset requires that they give
capital to the manager, who forms a portfolio consisting of the risky and riskless assets.
The manager earns a management fee proportional to the assets under management.
The model features two types of opacity in financial markets. First, the funds are
opaque in that investors cannot observe the funds’ portfolios and the fund managers
1According to Hedge Fund Research, in 1990 there were only 610 hedge funds managing $39 billion
of assets globally, but in 2013 there are more than 10,000 funds with $2,400 billion of assets.
2See also Jarrow and O’Hara (1989) and Rogalski and Seward (1991), who find overpricing of Primes
and Scores and foreign currency exchange warrants, respectively.
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cannot commit to their portfolio choices. An example is a hedge fund adopting a flexible
trading strategy that is not communicated to investors. Second, the risky asset is opaque
in that investors cannot observe its payoffs. An example is a sophisticated derivative
whose payoff information is, for nonprofessional investors, unavailable or prohibitively
costly. Another manifestation of opacity is the complex nature of an asset that makes it
difficult to comprehend its payoffs. For instance, understanding the payoff of a structured
product may require wading through its prospectus and disclosure documents, which are
hundreds of pages long and filled with technical jargon. The volume of information and
extent of technical difficulty make the asset’s payoffs effectively unobservable to investors.3
An important consequence of these two layers of opacity is that, although investors
can (obviously) observe the total return from a fund, they cannot see the composition
of that return. This is the source of an agency problem. Investors try to infer (i.e.,
back out) the opaque asset’s unobservable payoff from the observed fund return, learn
about the persistent component of that asset, and allocate capital on that basis. Yet
because the fund manager controls the portfolio that determines the fund return, that
manager can potentially manipulate investor learning through his portfolio choice. More
specifically, the manager can boost the expected fund return by (secretly) levering up
and overinvesting in the opaque asset, in an attempt to inflate investors’ estimates of
the persistent component of the asset’s payoff and hence their assessments of the fund’s
future prospects. Investors are thus led to allocate more capital to the fund, which yields
more fees. That is, the manager is motivated by an implicit incentive that is akin to an
endogenous “career concern.”
The model yields a number of results. An increase in fund manager career concerns
leads to a higher price of the opaque asset, higher fund leverage, reduced fund performance,
smaller fund size, and less social welfare. (Career concerns themselves are endogenous:
they increase with the volatility of the persistent component of the opaque asset’s payoff
and decrease with the volatility of the transitory component of the payoff.) A key mecha-
nism for the results is “signal jamming.” Managers who have greater career concerns are
more inclined to lever up secretly in an effort to inflate investor expectations about their
funds’ future performance, thereby attracting more capital and thus more fees. Investors
understand the managers’ desire to fool them and hence are not fooled in equilibrium;
nevertheless, the managers still lever up because otherwise their funds’ future prospects
would be underestimated by the investors who believe that the managers do lever up
3Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2009) refer to this as the information overload problem.
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secretly. Overinvestment drives up the asset’s price, resulting in lower expected returns
for both the asset and the funds. This discourages investors from investing in the funds,
so the funds shrink. In terms of utility, investors are unaffected, but managers are worse
off: they attract less capital and thus earn lower fees as they fail to commit to not fool
investors using opacity.
In contrast, if funds are transparent and portfolios are observable (e.g., mutual funds),
then the equilibrium does not depend on whether or not the risky asset is opaque. Indeed,
regardless of managers’ actions, investors always correctly back out the asset’s payoff
from the funds’ observed portfolios and returns, and therefore there is no scope for the
managers to manipulate investor learning. Therefore, the managers’ career concerns are
also irrelevant.
Next, I extend the model to accommodate both transparent and opaque funds, as
well as transparent and opaque assets with identical payoffs. Each fund can choose one
of the two risky assets to which to invest. In equilibrium, the opaque asset trades at a
premium over the transparent asset, consistent with the empirical facts already noted.
The result holds even though it is common knowledge that these assets yield identical
payoffs and all funds can purchase whichever asset they wish. The price gap between these
assets—the “opacity price premium”—increases with the extent of opaque fund managers’
career concerns. Accompanied by the opacity price premium, the market is endogenously
segmented: transparent funds trade only transparent assets, and opaque funds trade only
opaque assets. This is consistent with the real-world observation that mutual funds tend
to focus on traditional asset classes, whereas hedge funds often trade opaque, complex
financial instruments. The reason behind this segmentation is as follows. Because opaque
fund managers cannot commit to their portfolio choices, a moral hazard problem prevents
them from buying the transparent asset credibly; however, they can purchase the opaque
asset credibly, being motivated by their desire to inflate the investors’ expected fund
assessment. In contrast, transparent fund managers simply buy the cheaper transparent
asset because the asset’s opacity is irrelevant for them.
Last, the fundamental question of why opaque assets emerge in the first place is
addressed. In this model, they arise naturally from the demand of opaque fund managers.
To study the supply of opaque assets, I introduce “financial engineers”—that is, agents
who can make a transparent asset opaque and vice versa. In effect, the engineers act as
arbitrageurs who exploit the opacity price premium: as long as the premium is positive,
they buy transparent assets, make them opaque, and sell them at a profit. In equilibrium
then the engineers serve to eliminate the premium. A novel insight is that opacity is self-
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feeding in financial markets: given the opacity price premium, financial engineers exploit
it by supplying opaque assets, which in turn are a source of agency problems in portfolio
delegation, resulting in the opacity price premium.
This paper is related to the theoretical literature on complexity and obfuscation in
financial markets. Arora et al. (2009) show that the computational complexity of financial
derivatives may amplify adverse selection between buyers and sellers. I also show that
failing to understand financial instruments exacerbates asymmetric information problems.
In the work of Carlin (2009), oligopolistic firms add complexity to the price structures
of their products as a means of increasing their market power. Carlin and Manso (2011)
argue that, to preserve their information rents, financial institutions alter their retail
product offerings and in this way “interfere” with the learning of unsophisticated investors.
As in those papers, opacity in this paper is a strategic tool for exploiting less-informed
agents. Yet in contrast to those papers, our main focus is on the equilibrium price of
opaque financial assets in a competitive market.4
A growing body of theoretical literature discusses the equilibrium implications of del-
egated portfolio management (Allen and Gorton 1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Vayanos
2004; Cuoco and Kaniel 2011; He and Krishnamurthy 2012, 2013; Malliaris and Yan
2012; Vayanos and Woolley 2013). Kaniel and Kondor (2013) study, as do I in this paper,
the equilibrium asset prices and trading strategies of fund managers concerned with fund
flows. The flow-performance relationship is exogenous in their paper, but in this paper,
it stems endogenously from learning. The work of Berk and Green (2004) is also related,
in that fund flows endogenously stem from learning. Also, fund’s asset size in this paper
is determined in a similar fashion to their model, with the assumption that there are
decreasing returns to scale in each fund’s return. However, their model does not include
asset prices and does not explicitly address the manager-investor relationship.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on career concerns and asset prices
(Dasgupta and Prat 2008; Guerrieri and Kondor 2012; Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo
2011). In these papers, fund managers attempt to influence investor evaluation of their
ability. This paper is methodologically similar in that managers seek to influence investor
expectations about their funds’ future prospects.
4See also Caballero and Simsek (2010), who model complexity as banks’ limited knowledge of the
interlinkages between banks in a financial network.
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1 Model
Time t is discrete and runs from zero to infinity. There is a single risky asset and a riskless
asset. The riskless asset has an infinitely elastic supply at an exogenous rate of return
r > 0 and is freely accessible to all agents. There are two classes of competitive agents—
fund managers and investors—and it is only through fund managers that investors can
access the risky asset. The risky asset is opaque in that its payoffs are unobservable to
the investors. The managers’ portfolio choices, the investors’ capital investments in the
funds, and the risky asset’s price are determined in equilibrium.
1.1 Risky asset
1.1.1 Payoff
In period t = 1, 2, ..., the risky asset yields a stochastic per-share payoff of δt = δ¯t + ut.
Here, the persistent component δ¯t evolves according to δ¯t = δ¯t−1 +vt, where the noise vt is
i.i.d. across time and is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1/ηv. The initial
value δ¯0 is drawn by nature from a normal distribution with mean δˆ0 and variance 1/η0.
The transitory component ut is i.i.d. across time and is normally distributed with mean 0
and variance 1/ηu. Nobody in this economy can observe δ¯t, vt, or ut. The payoff history
up to period t is denoted by Ht ≡ (δ1, ..., δt).
1.1.2 Price and return
The asset is traded in the market at a publicly observable market-clearing price, Pt. The
asset’s supply, S > 0, is constant over time. I denote by Rt+1 ≡ δt+1 +Pt+1− (1+r)Pt the
excess return on the risky asset per share (i.e., the dollar-value excess return multiplied
by Pt). The expected excess return conditional on Ht is Rˆt+1 ≡ E[Rt+1|Ht].
1.1.3 Asset’s opacity
In Sections 1, 2, and 3, the risky asset is assumed to be opaque in the sense that the
payoff realization δt is not directly observable to the investors.
5 The managers can ob-
serve δt directly. An alternative interpretation of δt’s unobservability is that the asset is
“complex” in that the investors are unable to understand its payoffs. As explained ear-
lier, such complexity makes the asset’s payoff effectively unobservable. An example of the
5It is not important that only the opaque asset is available for investment. Sections 4 and 5 analyze
the cases in which the transparent asset (with observable δt) coexists with the opaque asset.
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opaque asset is derivative-based securities, such as a structured product. Anecdotal evi-
dence mentioned in the popular press is that it is virtually impossible for nonprofessional
investors to track and/or comprehend such a security’s payoffs because they typically
“feature payouts linked underlying assets such as a narrow or proprietary index or some
other obscure benchmark (Financial Times, September 29, 2013).”6
1.2 Portfolio management
There is a measure-1 continuum of investment funds, each indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Fund i
consists of an infinitely lived fund manager (manager i) and a number of risk-neutral in-
vestors from overlapping generations, who each live for two periods (investors i). Investors
i can invest capital in fund i, in which manager i allocates the capital between the risky
and the riskless assets. I assume that each fund is “captive” in the sense that investors
i can neither invest in nor observe any activities in the other funds. This assumption
simplifies the investor’s inference problem, while preserving each manager’s competitive
behavior in the asset market.
1.2.1 Capital investment
In period t, a large number of investors i of generation t arrive at each fund i. Each
investor is endowed with a certain amount of dollars and decides to invest them in the
fund and the riskless asset. Let Xi,t denote the fund’s assets under management, that is,
the total amount of capital that investors i invest in the fund in period t. I refer to Xi,t
as the size of fund i.
1.2.2 Portfolio choice
On behalf of investors i, manager i forms a portfolio. For each dollar of investor capital,
the manager buys θi,t ∈ [0,∞) shares of the risky asset and invests (1 − Ptθi,t) dollars
in the riskless asset.7 That is, the manager purchases θi,tXi,t shares of the risky asset in
total. I refer to θi,t as the manager’s portfolio.
6Given the assumption that Pt is observable to investors, a suitable example of opaque assets can be
derivatives traded on exchanges (as opposed to over the counter). Their transaction prices are readily
available at the exchanges’ Web sites (e.g., Eurex Group), but their payoff information is difficult to track
for most unprofessional investors. Also, even complicated structured products are traded on secondary
markets and the price data are available at trading platforms’ Web sites (e.g., Interactive Investor),
whereas their periodic payoffs are hard to track for most retail investors.
7If 1 > Ptθi,t, then the manager buys the riskless asset; if 1 < Ptθi,t, then he sells the asset (i.e.,
borrows funds) to finance purchasing the risky asset.
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1.2.3 Fund return
Following Berk and Green (2004), I assume that each fund must expend resources that
are increasing and convex in the fund size Xi,t. For tractability, the cost is specified as
cX2i,t with c > 0.
8 This management cost can be viewed (as in Berk and Green 2004) as
the trading costs associated with liquidity or price impacts in (unmodeled) thin financial
markets. The fund’s total payout to investors in period t + 1, denoted Yi,t+1, consists of
the proceeds from the portfolio minus the management cost: Yi,t+1 ≡ Rt+1θi,tXi,t + (1 +
r)Xi,t− cX2i,t. I refer to Yi,t+1 as the fund return. Convexity of the management cost leads
to decreasing returns to scale in fund return, which has been documented in the empirical
literature.9 Each investor i can observe the entire history of both Xi,t and Yi,t.
1.2.4 Manager’s objective
The manager derives a benefit from the size Xi,t of the fund managed. I specify the benefit
as φXi,t with φ > 0. This benefit can be interpreted as a fixed-percentage management
fee or as utility resulting from a manager’s “empire building” motive. The interpretation
as a fee is plausible because the compensation contracts in most investment funds include
a fixed percentage of assets under management (Deli 2002). Therefore, in what follows I
refer to this benefit as the fee.10 To prevent the manager from choosing an infinitely large
θi,t, I assume that he incurs a nonpecuniary cost κθ
2
i,t/2, where κ > 0, when choosing θi,t.
This cost can be interpreted as a reduced form of the manager’s risk aversion. Indeed, in
an alternative setting in which (1) the manager has a mean-variance objective function
and (2) the fund’s management cost, c, is stochastic, this quadratic cost would exactly
represent his risk aversion (see Appendix A for details). Instead of deriving the risk-
aversion formulation from first principles, I use this reduced-form specification to preserve
tractability. The manager’s utility in period t is the difference between the fee and his
personal cost of choosing θi,t. Hence, manager i’s problem in period t, denoted by PMi,t , is
8The quadratic form is tractable because, as shown in what follows, it will make Xi,t linear in
the investors’ expected excess return on the risky asset. As in other standard signal jamming models,
preserving a linear structure is critical for the model’s solvability.
9For empirical evidence of decreasing returns to scale, see Chen et al. (2004) and Edelen, Evans, and
Kadlec (2007) for mutual funds and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2004) for hedge funds. Given these pieces
of evidence, it is now standard to assume decreasing returns to scale in theoretical models. Besides Berk
and Green (2004), see also Pastor and Stambaugh (2012) and Savov (2013).
10It is also possible to assume that each investor actually pays a monetary fee with a proportional
rate φ ∈ (0, 1) to the manager. Although closed-form solutions exist for the model in that setting and
the economic insights are very similar, the solutions are less tractable computationally.
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choosing θi,t ∈ [0,∞) to maximize
E
[ ∞∑
τ=0
βτ
(
φXi,t+τ − κ
2
θ2i,t+τ
) ∣∣∣∣FMi,t
]
, (1.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and FMi,t = {Yi,τ , Xi,τ , θi,τ , Pτ , δτ : τ ≤ t} is the
manager’s information set in period t.
1.2.5 Fund’s opacity
I compare the case of transparent funds (Section 2), where investors can directly observe
θi,t, with the case of opaque funds (Section 3), where investors cannot observe θi,t and
the manager cannot commit to the choice of θi,t. An example of a transparent fund is
a mutual fund whose portfolio holdings are disclosed and whose trading strategy is well
understood by investors. An example of an opaque fund is a hedge fund that adopts a
flexible trading strategy that is not communicated to investors.
1.3 Learning
Because δ¯t is unobservable, agents try to learn it using a Kalman filter. The learning
processes of managers and investors can be different because of a difference in their ability
to observe the asset’s periodic payoff δt. These are detailed as follows.
1.3.1 Managers’ learning
The managers’ learning is standard: in period t, they estimate δ¯t based on the payoff
history Ht that they observe directly. Let δˆt ≡ E[δ¯t|Ht] denote their period-t estimate of
δ¯t.
11 By Kalman filtering, if they observe δt, they update δˆt as
δˆt = λtδˆt−1 + (1− λt)δt (1.2)
with the updating factor λt ∈ (0, 1) evolving deterministically as
λt+1 =
1
2 + ηu
ηv
− λt , (1.3)
11Note that δˆt is the estimate not only of δ¯t but also of its future values δ¯t+τ (τ = 1, 2, ...), future
payoffs δt+τ (τ = 1, 2, ...), and future values of δˆ itself (i.e., δˆt is a martingale). That is, E[δ¯t+τ |Ht] =
E[δt+τ |Ht] = E[δˆt+τ |Ht] = δˆt holds for τ = 1, 2, ....
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as shown in Appendix B. It is clear from (1.3) that, as t→∞, λt converges to a constant
λ ≡ 1 + 1
2
(
ηu
ηv
)
−
(
1
4
(
ηu
ηv
)2
+
(
ηu
ηv
))1/2
. (1.4)
Note that dλ/dηu < 0, dλ/dηv > 0, and 0 < λ < 1. Given λ < 1, (1.2) implies that
the true value of δ¯t is never learned, even when t → ∞. This is because δ¯t itself is
stochastically time varying (i.e., ηv <∞).
1.3.2 Investors’ learning
Unlike the managers, the investors cannot observe δt directly. Hence, they estimate δ¯t
based on the value of δt that they infer from the available information. There is a subtlety
here. As shown later, the investors will correctly infer δt on the equilibrium path, both
in the transparent fund case (Section 2) and the opaque fund case (Section 3). So their
learning on the equilibrium path is described by (1.2) as well. However, in the opaque
fund case, the investors’ inference of δt may be incorrect off the equilibrium path because
the managers can manipulate their inference by secretly deviating from their equilibrium
strategy (i.e., choosing θi,t that is not anticipated by the investors) in an effort to attract
more investor capital and thereby increase fees. The investors are not fooled on the
equilibrium path because they are rational; however, importantly, the fact that they are
potentially fooled off the equilibrium path does affect the agents’ actions and the prices
on the equilibrium path. Therefore, it is critical (especially in the analysis of the opaque
fund case) to distinguish between the true value of δt and the value of δt inferred by the
investors. Let HIi,t ≡ (δIi,1, ..., δIi,t) denote the payoff history that investors i infer, where
δIi,t is the value of δt they infer. Their period-t estimate of δ¯t is δˆ
I
i,t ≡ E[δ¯t|F Ii,t], where F Ii,t
is the information set of investors i in period t (defined later). Similarly, their conditional
expectation of the excess return is RˆIi,t+1 ≡ E[Rt+1|F Ii,t]. By Kalman filtering, if they infer
that the value of δt is δ
I
i,t, they update δˆ
I
i,t as
δˆIi,t = λtδˆ
I
i,t−1 + (1− λt)δIi,t, (1.5)
where δˆIi,0 = δˆ0 is exogenously given and the updating factor λt is the same as that of
(1.2) (see Appendix B). Clearly, if HIi,t = Ht, which holds on the equilibrium path, then
(1.5) is identical to (1.2).
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1.4 Definition of equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the price function Pt(δˆt), the fund size Xi,t, and the manager’s
portfolio θi,t for i ∈ [0, 1] such that, for all t, the following statements hold.
1. Given Pt(δˆt) and the others’ actions, each investor optimally allocates her endow-
ment between the fund and the riskless asset.
2. Given Pt(δˆt) and the others’ actions, manager i solves PMi,t .
3. The risky asset’s market clears: ∫ 1
0
θi,tXi,t di = S. (1.6)
4. Every agent has correct beliefs about the other agents’ actions.
5. Each agent updates the estimate of δ¯t via Kalman filtering.
2 Transparent Funds
As a benchmark, I start by characterizing the equilibrium for the case of transparent funds;
that is, θi,t is directly observable to investors i when they make investment decisions.
The risky asset is opaque: δt is unobservable to the investors. The information set of
investors i in period t, which includes variables that are directly observable to them, is
F Ii,t = {Yi,τ , Xi,τ , θi,τ , Pτ : τ ≤ t}.
It is important in the transparent fund case that all investors always correctly infer
δt, despite it not being directly observable, whether on or off the equilibrium path. The
reason is that, in period t, investors i can back out δt from the observed Yi,t, Xi,t−1,
Pt, Pt−1, and θi,t−1. Thus, effectively, δt can be included in the investors’ information
set: F Ii,t = {Yi,τ , Xi,τ , θi,τ , Pτ : τ ≤ t} = {Yi,τ , Xi,τ , θi,τ , Pτ , δτ : τ ≤ t}. That is, in the
transparent fund case, the investors and the managers have the same information (F Ii,t =
FMi,t ). Therefore, all agents have the same estimate (δˆIi,t = δˆt) and the same expected
excess return (RˆIi,t+1 = Rˆt+1) for all t.
I conjecture and later verify that there exists a publicly known constant γ > 0 such
that the price function is
P (δˆt) =
δˆt
r
− γ. (2.1)
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The intuition for this conjecture is simple. The first term on the the right-hand side
(RHS) is the present value of the expected future payoffs, discounted at the riskless rate;
the second term is (as discussed later) the “cost premium”—that is, the return that
compensates investors for the costs they incur.
2.1 Investors’ optimizations
The fund size Xi,t is determined by the investors’ optimal decisions, in a fashion similar
to Berk and Green (2004). First, define the fund return per dollar of capital as yi,t+1 ≡
Yi,t+1/Xi,t = Rt+1θi,t + (1 + r) − cXi,t. In period t, observing θi,t, investors i increase
their capital investment in the fund as long as the expectation of yi,t+1 is greater than
the riskless asset’s return. Because yi,t+1 exhibits decreasing returns to scale, Xi,t is
determined by the investors’ indifference condition:
E[yi,t+1
∣∣F Ii,t] = 1 + r. (2.2)
The left-hand side (LHS) of (2.2) is the expected return from investing in the fund, and
the RHS is from investing in the riskless asset. Solving (2.2) for Xi,t yields the period-t
size of fund i as a function of the expected excess return Rˆt+1 and the manager’s portfolio
θi,t:
Xi,t = X(Rˆt+1, θi,t) ≡ 1
c
Rˆt+1θi,t. (2.3)
Intuitively, more capital is invested in the fund when the expected excess return on the
fund portfolio (Rˆt+1θi,t) is higher or the management cost c is lower.
2.2 Manager’s optimization
A transparent fund manager’s problem is simple. Because the investors inferHt regardless
of his actions, there is no scope for the manager to influence the decisions of future
investors. Therefore, in effect, his problem is static: in each period t, he chooses θi,t to
maximize his period-t utility, taking into account that Xi,t responds to θi,t according to
(2.3). That is, PMi,t reduces to choosing θi,t ∈ [0,∞) to maximize
φX(Rˆt+1, θi,t)− κ
2
θ2i,t. (2.4)
12
So given Rˆt+1, the manager’s optimal portfolio is, for all i,
θi,t = θ(Rˆt+1) ≡ φ
cκ
Rˆt+1. (2.5)
Not surprisingly, the manager allocates more capital to the risky asset when the fee rate
and the expected excess return are higher or the costs of investment are lower.
2.3 Equilibrium
The risky asset’s equilibrium expected excess return Rˆt+1 is pinned down by plugging the
agents’ optimal policies, (2.3) and (2.5), into the market-clearing condition (1.6). For all
t,
Rˆt+1 = Rˆ ≡ cS1/3
(
κ
φ
)2/3
. (2.6)
This is increasing in the fund’s management cost c and in the manager’s cost-benefit
ratio κ/φ, because agents require a positive expected excess return on the risky asset as
compensation for such costs.
Once Rˆ is identified, the equilibrium price and the agents’ actions are readily deter-
mined. Conjecture (2.1) implies that Pt can be written as Pt = (δˆt/r)−(γ+Rˆt+1)/(1+r).12
This, together with (2.6), implies that conjecture (2.1) is correct if and only if γ =
(γ+ Rˆ)/(1 + r) or γ = Rˆ/r. That is, the equilibrium price is equal to the present value of
the expected future payoffs (δˆt/r) minus the present value of the future expected excess
returns (Rˆ/r). The agents’ equilibrium actions are determined by plugging (2.6) into
(2.3) and (2.5).
Proposition 2.1 summarizes the stationary equilibrium in the long run (i.e., t → ∞),
where all variables are constant, except for Pt, which depends on δˆt. For notational clarity,
in the transparent fund case I append an asterisk to the equilibrium values of endogenous
variables and omit the time indices for variables that are time invariant.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose the risky asset’s payoff δt is unobservable, but the manager’s
portfolio θi,t is directly observable to the investors. A symmetric stationary equilibrium
exists. In this equilibrium,
1. all investors infer δt correctly, and all agents update the estimate of δ¯t by (1.2) with
λt = λ,
12Using (2.1), we obtain Rt+1 = δt+1 +
(
δˆt+1
r − γ
)
− (1 + r)Pt. Because E[δt+1|Ht] = E[δˆt+1|Ht] = δˆt,
we have Rˆt+1 =
(
1+r
r
)
δˆt − γ − (1 + r)Pt. Rearranging it yields the result.
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2. the risky asset’s price is P ∗(δˆt) = (δˆt − Rˆ∗)/r, where Rˆ∗ = cS1/3 (κ/φ)2/3 ,
3. each fund’s size is X∗ = S2/3 (κ/φ)1/3 , and
4. each manager buys θ∗ = (φS/κ)1/3 shares of the risky asset per dollar of investor
capital.
Because λ < 1, the estimate δˆt is stochastically time varying even in the long run.
The reason is that δ¯t is itself stochastic (i.e., ηv <∞), and so the agents never learn the
true value of δ¯t. The price Pt is stochastic as it reflects δˆt. The fund size X
∗ is increasing
in the manager’s cost-benefit ratio κ/φ because it is positively related to Rˆ∗. The fund’s
management cost c does not affect X∗ because investors are compensated for a higher c
exactly by a higher Rˆ∗. The manager’s portfolio θ∗ is, as expected, negatively affected by
his cost-benefit ratio.
Corollary 2.1. In the stationary equilibrium of the transparent fund case,
1. the expected return on each investor’s investment is 1 + r, and
2. each manager’s one-period utility is UM∗ ≡ φX∗ − κθ∗2/2 = S2/3κ1/3φ2/3/2.
The expected return for the investors is equalized to the riskless return 1 + r by their
indifference condition (2.2).13 The manager’s utility is increasing in the fee φ as expected.
It is also increasing in his personal nonpecuniary cost κ for the following reason. On
the one hand, a large κ is costly for the manager because the nonpecuniary cost κθ2i,t/2
is large. On the other hand, however, a large κ means that the asset’s expected excess
return Rˆ∗ is high in equilibrium. This high Rˆ∗ encourages investors to allocate a large
amount of capital X∗ to the fund, resulting in a large fee revenue φX∗ for the manager.
The second positive effect outweighs the first negative effect, and therefore the net impact
of κ on UM∗ is positive.
13This result means that, despite the positive expected excess return Rˆ on the risky asset, the ex-
pected excess return on the fund (from the investors’ perspective) is zero in equilibrium. This is because
decreasing returns to scale drive down the after-cost expected fund return to the riskless return 1 + r. In
relation to this point, it is worth comparing this model with Berk and Green’s (2004) model. Berk and
Green (2004) focus only on fund’s return that investors receive, omitting individual asset’s market equi-
librium. They argue that each fund manager’s skill could potentially generate excess return (alpha) on
the fund, but it eventually disappears in equilibrium because of decreasing returns to scale. In contrast,
my model concerns both the fund’s and the individual asset’s equilibrium returns. As shown in (2.6), the
presence of investment cost (i.e., the manager’s risk aversion κ) leads to excess return Rˆ on the asset,
remaining positive in equilibrium, whereas excess return on the fund disappears in equilibrium because
of decreasing returns to scale.
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Last, an obvious, but important, implication of the transparent fund case is presented
in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.2. In the transparent fund case, the risky asset’s opacity is irrelevant: that
is, whether or not δt is observable to the investors, the equilibrium outcome would be
identical.
The intuition for Corollary 2.2 is that, as long as the manager’s portfolio θi,t is observ-
able, every investor can infer the unobservable payoff history Ht correctly, both on and
off the equilibrium path, just as if it could be observed directly. As discussed in the next
section, this will not be the case if the fund’s portfolio is opaque. The idea of Corollary
2.2 will play a key role in the models of Sections 4 and 5, where the transparent and
opaque funds and assets coexist.
3 Opaque Funds
This section characterizes the equilibrium for the case of opaque funds; that is, investors
cannot directly observe θi,t and the manager cannot commit to his choice of θi,t. The risky
asset is opaque: δt is unobservable to the investors. Thus, the information set of investors
i in period t is F Ii,t = {Yi,τ , Xi,τ , Pτ : τ ≤ t}.
Because the investors cannot observe δt, they try to infer it. However, unlike the trans-
parent fund case, the investors cannot back out δt immediately from the observed variables
because here both δt and θi,t are unobservable. Thus, the investors must infer δt based
on their beliefs about θi,t (instead of the actual θi,t chosen). Although investors do infer
δt correctly on the equilibrium path, their inference may be incorrect off the equilibrium
path because the manager can secretly deviate from his equilibrium strategy (i.e., choose
θi,t that is not anticipated by investors) in an effort to manipulate the investor inference
of δt and attract more investor capital and thus more fees. Investors are not fooled on the
equilibrium path because they are rational; however, the fact that they can be fooled off
the equilibrium path does affect the agents’ actions and the prices on the equilibrium path.
Therefore, it is critical in this section (especially when solving the manager’s problem in
Section 3.3) to study investor beliefs and actions on off-the-equilibrium paths, where the
investors may be fooled by the manager. For this purpose, it is important to distinguish
between the variables related to the investors’ beliefs (δIi,t,HIi,t, δˆIi,t, RˆIi,t+1) and those of
the managers (δt,Ht, δˆt, Rˆt+1).
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3.1 Conjectures and out-of-equilibrium beliefs
I propose (and later verify) the following two conjectures.
1. There exists {γt}∞t=0 > 0, which is nonstochastic and publicly known, such that the
price function is
Pt(δˆ
I
t ) =
δˆIt
r
− γt where δˆIt ≡
∫ 1
0
δˆIi,t di. (3.1)
2. There exists {θ∗∗t }∞t=0 > 0, which is nonstochastic and publicly known, such that,
for all i ∈ [0, 1], manager i optimally plays
θi,t = θ
∗∗
t (3.2)
on the equilibrium path and also on off-the-equilibrium paths, where δˆIi,t 6= δˆt.
The intuition for conjecture (3.1) is simple. The first term, δˆIt /r, is the present value of
the average of all the investors’ expected future payoffs discounted at the riskless rate.
The second term, γt, is the cost premium; unlike the transparent fund case, this premium
is now (deterministically) time varying. Note that every agent knows the form of price
function (3.1), and therefore can infer the investors’ average estimate δˆIt by observing Pt.
Conjecture (3.2) states that the manager will optimally buy a deterministic number of
shares of the risky asset per dollar of investor capital, regardless of his own past actions
(θi,0, ..., θi,t−1).
It will be shown later that all investors correctly infer Ht on the equilibrium path,
and therefore have the same estimate of δ¯t. Thus, on the equilibrium path, each investor
observes Pt and confirms that her estimate based on her inferred payoff history HIi,t is
the same as the other investors’ average estimate δˆIt (revealed by Pt). In other words,
E[δ¯t|HIi,t] = δˆIt for all i and t on the equilibrium path. However, on off-the-equilibrium
paths for which some agents deviate from their equilibrium strategies, some investors may
observe Pt, learn δˆ
I
t from it, and realize that their estimate E[δ¯t|HIi,t] does not match δˆIt .
For such cases, I specify the following out-of-equilibrium belief of investors:
If E[δ¯t|HIi,t] 6= δˆIt then δˆIi,t = E[δ¯t|HIi,t]. (3.3)
This states that an investor whose estimate (based solely on her inferred payoff history
HIi,t) disagrees with the other investors’ average estimate δˆIt believes that her own estimate
is more accurate. Note that such a belief makes sense: in this model, investors have no
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reason to revise their estimate in favor of the observed price because that price need not
convey information that is superior to theirs.14
3.2 Investors’ optimizations
As in the transparent fund case, the investors’ indifference condition (2.2) pins down the
fund size:
Xi,t = X(Rˆ
I
i,t+1, θ
∗∗
t ) =
1
c
RˆIi,t+1θ
∗∗
t . (3.4)
Importantly, (3.4) differs from its transparent fund counterpart (2.3) in two ways. First,
Xi,t depends on the expected excess return from investors i’s point of view, Rˆ
I
i,t+1, which
is not necessarily equal to Rˆt+1 on some off-the-equilibrium paths. On the equilibrium
path, of course, RˆIi,t+1 = Rˆt+1 for all i and t because all the investors infer Ht correctly.
Second, Xi,t depends on the investors’ belief (θ
∗∗
t ) about the manager’s action, and not
on the action itself (θi,t), which they cannot observe. This is the source of the manager’s
moral hazard, which will play a central role in the following analyses.
3.3 Manager’s optimization
The manager’s problem drastically differs from that of the transparent fund case. Recall
that the fund size Xi,t is determined by the investors’ belief that manager i chooses θ
∗∗
t ,
regardless of the θi,t actually chosen. So if the manager were to maximize only his period-t
utility, an extreme moral hazard would occur: for any belief θ∗∗t of investors, the manager
would just choose θi,t = 0 because θi,t > 0 would not affect Xi,t and yet is costly. However,
in the dynamic setting considered here, the manager will choose θi,t > 0 in equilibrium
because he is motivated by a (endogenous) career concern: although his choice of θi,t
does not affect the current fund size, it can potentially affect the future fund size through
influencing the investor beliefs in future periods. In sum, the main difference in the
manager’s problem in the two cases is that the manager of a transparent fund chooses his
current portfolio θi,t by weighing its cost κθ
2
i,t/2 against the benefit from influencing the
14In asymmetric information models a` la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or differential information
models a` la Grossman (1976), investors should revise their estimates in favor of the price because it
reflects superior information. In the model proposed here, however, no investor has information superior
to the other funds’ investors and no one has private information that would be collectively useful. On
the equilibrium path, the price just confirms each investor’s estimate. Also note that investors i have no
reason to believe that discrepancy in the estimates is caused by manager i’s deviation; after all, it could
be other funds’ managers or investors who have deviated.
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current fund size Xi,t, whereas the manager of an opaque fund weighs such costs against
the benefit from influencing the future fund sizes Xi,t+τ , τ = 1, 2, ....
Now, let us verify that it is indeed optimal for manager i to play (θ∗∗0 , θ
∗∗
1 , ...) > 0 de-
terministically. To do so, first we need to consider what would happen if he deviated from
his equilibrium play and instead chose a sequence of portfolios (θi,0, θi,1, ...) 6= (θ∗∗0 , θ∗∗1 , ...)
even as investors i still believe that he chooses (θ∗∗0 , θ
∗∗
1 , ...). Such a deviation does not
affect the asset’s prices because each manager has measure zero.
I first determine the effect of a sequence of deviations (θi,0, θi,1, ...) on the payoff δ
I
i,t+1
as inferred by investors i. The value of δIi,t+1 solves(
δIi,t+1 + Pt+1 − (1 + r)Pt
)
θ∗∗t Xi,t =
(
δt+1 + Pt+1 − (1 + r)Pt
)
θi,tXi,t. (3.5)
The RHS is the excess return on the fund’s portfolio, Rt+1θi,tXi,t, whose value is known to
investors i who observe Yi,t+1. This value depends on the manager’s actual choice, θi,t, and
the true payoff, δt+1. The LHS is the decomposition of that excess return as (incorrectly)
inferred by investors i. It depends on their incorrect belief about the manager’s action,
θ∗∗t , and implies an erroneous inferred payoff, δ
I
i,t+1. Clearly, the source of the investors’
error is their inability to observe two variables: δt+1 and θi,t. Solving (3.5) for δ
I
i,t+1, we
have
δIi,t+1 = δt+1 +
(
θi,t − θ∗∗t
θ∗∗t
)
Rt+1. (3.6)
Hence, if the manager plays θi,t > θ
∗∗
t and if Rt+1 > 0, then the investors will overshoot
their inference, that is, δIi,t+1 > δt+1.
Given δIi,t+1 > δt+1, the investors’ estimate of the persistent component of the asset’s
payoff will be biased upward in future periods, that is, δˆIi,t+τ > δˆt+τ for τ = 1, 2, ... (see
Appendix C).15 Then their expectation about the asset’s excess return is also inflated in
the future, that is, RˆIi,t+τ+1 > Rˆt+τ+1 for τ = 1, 2, ... (see Appendix C).
16 Thus, by (3.4),
the future fund size Xi,t+τ for τ = 1, 2, ... is larger than that on the equilibrium path.
That is, the manager can potentially influence Xi,t+τ for τ = 1, 2, ... through his choice of
θi,t. Of course, he takes this fact into account when choosing θi,t. It can be shown that
15A key for this overshoot of δˆIi,t+τ to occur is the out-of-equilibrium belief (3.3), which leads the
investors to stick by their own estimate when it disagrees with the other investors’ average estimate δˆIt+τ
that is revealed by Pt+τ . Note that, on this off-the-equilibrium path, the investors are aware that their
estimate δˆIi,t+τ is higher than δˆ
I
t+τ but are unaware that it is too high: they (incorrectly) believe that
δˆIi,t+τ is more accurate than δˆ
I
t+τ .
16Intuitively, in period t+ τ , the investors’ high estimate δˆIi,t+τ leads them to expect both δt+τ+1 and
Pt+τ+1 to be high; given the observed price Pt+τ , they expect that Rt+τ+1 will also be high.
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his maximization problem in period t (both on and off the equilibrium path) is written
as follows.
Lemma 3.1. Manager i chooses θi,t ∈ [0,∞) to maximize
−κ
2
θ2i,t +
φ
c
(
θi,t − θ∗∗t
θ∗∗t
)
ΩtRˆt+1 (3.7)
where Ωt ≡ (1− λt+1)
∞∑
τ=1
βτθ∗∗t+τ
(
1 +
1− λt+τ+1
r
)( t+τ∏
ν=t+2
λν
)
.
The first term of (3.7) is the manager’s personal cost of choosing θi,t; the second term
corresponds to his expected gain from influencing the fund size in future periods. On
the equilibrium path, the second term of (3.7) is zero because θi,t = θ
∗∗
t . Nonetheless,
this term still affects the manager’s equilibrium action because the marginal effect of θi,t
on that term is nonzero even on the equilibrium path. The variable Ωt measures the
sensitivity of the manager’s expected future gain to an increase in θi,t. Observe that Ωt
is deterministic and publicly known.
Maximizing (3.7) given Rˆt+1 and θ
∗∗
t , the manager’s optimal choice of θi,t is
θi,t =
1
θ∗∗t
φ
cκ
ΩtRˆt+1. (3.8)
As will be shown in Section 3.4, Rˆt+1 is a deterministic variable. So conjecture (3.2) is
correct (and the investors’ beliefs are consistent) if θi,t = θ
∗∗
t holds in (3.8)—that is, if
θ∗∗t =
(
φ
cκ
ΩtRˆt+1
)1/2
. (3.9)
The values of θ∗∗t and Rˆt+1 will be obtained explicitly once the market-clearing condition
is imposed and another relation between θ∗∗t and Rˆt+1 is identified (in Section 3.4).
3.4 Equilibrium
The market-clearing condition (1.6) determines the asset’s price and the agents’ actions.
Plugging the agents’ optimal policies (3.4) and (3.8) into (1.6), and noting that RˆIi,t+1 =
Rˆt+1 holds for all i in equilibrium, Rˆt+1 is obtained as
Rˆt+1 = c
(
κS
φΩt
)1/2
. (3.10)
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It is intuitive that Rˆt+1 is decreasing in Ωt. For a given Rˆt+1, a rise in Ω induces the
manager to increase θi,t. This increase then leads to a higher Xi,t because, holding Rˆt+1
constant, a rise in θi,t increases the expected value of yi,t+1. These higher θi,t and Xi,t lead
to a higher aggregate demand for the risky asset. Thus, Rˆt+1 decreases (i.e., Pt increases)
to clear the market.
Now we can obtain the price Pt. Conjecture (3.1) implies that Pt is written as Pt =
(δˆIt /r)− (γt+1 + Rˆt+1)/(1 + r).17 This implies that conjecture (3.1) is correct if and only
if γt = (γt+1 + Rˆt+1)/(1 + r) or
γt =
∞∑
τ=0
(
1
1 + r
)τ+1
Rˆt+τ+1. (3.11)
That is, again, the price equals the present value of the expected future payoffs (δˆIt /r)
minus the present value of the future expected excess returns.
Note that Rˆt+1 and γt are not entirely solved in (3.10) and (3.11), respectively, in that
their RHS depend on Ωt, which in turn still depends on endogenous variables θ
∗∗
t+1, θ
∗∗
t+2, ....
However, in the long-run stationary equilibrium, where t→∞, these variables are solved
in closed form. To clarify matters, I append two asterisks to the equilibrium values of
endogenous variables in the opaque fund case and omit the time indexes for time-invariant
variables. It can be shown (see Appendix D) that the stationary values of Ωt and θ
∗∗
t satisfy
Ω∗∗ = ξθ∗∗, (3.12)
where ξ ≡
(
1 +
1− λ
r
)
β(1− λ)
1− βλ > 0. (3.13)
The composite parameter ξ plays a central role in the following analyses. It measures the
degree of the manager’s career concern in the stationary equilibrium. When ξ is higher,
the expected marginal gain to the manager from investing in the risky asset is higher,
and thus his desire to “fool” future investors by increasing θi,t is stronger. Note that ξ
is increasing in β and ηu but is decreasing in ηv and r. Intuitively, the manager’s career
17Using price function (3.1), Rt+1 = δt+1 +
(
1
r
∫ 1
0
δˆIi,t+1 di− γt+1
)
− (1 + r)Pt = δt+1 +
1
r
∫ 1
0
(
λt+1δˆ
I
i,t + (1− λt+1)δt+1
)
di−γt+1−(1+r)Pt =
(
1 + 1−λt+1r
)
δt+1+
λt+1
r
∫ 1
0
δˆIi,t di−γt+1−(1+r)Pt.
Thus, RˆIi,t+1 =
(
1 + 1−λt+1r
)
δˆIi,t +
λt+1
r
∫ 1
0
δˆIi,t di − γt+1 − (1 + r)Pt. Integrating over i and noting that
RˆIi,t+1 = Rˆt+1 for all i in equilibrium, we have Rˆt+1 =
(
1 + 1−λt+1r
) ∫ 1
0
δˆIi,t di +
λt+1
r
∫ 1
0
δˆIi,t di − γt+1 −
(1 + r)Pt =
(
1+r
r
)
δˆIt − γt+1 − (1 + r)Pt. Rearranging it, the result holds.
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concern is stronger if his interest in the future is high (high β) and when the investors’
estimate δˆt is inaccurate and thus susceptible to manipulation (low λ, which stems from
high ηu or low ηv). The constant ξ may take any positive value because ξ → 0 when
β → 0, but ξ →∞ when r → 0.18
Using (3.12), we can rewrite the stationary versions of (3.9) and (3.10) as a system
of equations with two unknowns, Rˆ∗∗ and θ∗∗, yielding simple closed-form solutions (see
Proposition 3.1). Then X∗∗ and γ∗∗ are obtained from (3.4) and (3.11).
Proposition 3.1 summarizes the long-run stationary equilibrium. Note that δˆIt = δˆt for
all t on the equilibrium path because all investors correctly infer δt.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the risky asset’s payoff δt and the manager’s portfolio θi,t are
both unobservable to the investors. A symmetric stationary equilibrium exists. On the
equilibrium path,
1. all investors infer δt correctly, and all agents update the estimate of δ¯t by (1.2) with
λt = λ,
2. the risky asset’s price is P ∗∗(δˆt) = (δˆt − Rˆ∗∗)/r, where Rˆ∗∗ = ξ−2/3Rˆ∗,
3. each fund’s size is X∗∗ = ξ−1/3X∗, and
4. each manager buys θ∗∗ = ξ1/3θ∗ shares of the risky asset per dollar of investor
capital.
The equilibrium is supported by the investors’ out-of-equilibrium belief (3.3).
Clearly, the key difference from the transparent fund case (Proposition 2.1) is the
presence of the manager’s career concern ξ. Indeed, all the stationary equilibrium variables
of the opaque fund case coincide with those of the transparent fund case if ξ = 1. This fact
facilitates comparing the equilibrium values of the transparent and opaque fund cases. If
ξ > 1, then the risky asset is more expensive, the fund size is smaller, and the fund’s
portfolio is riskier in the opaque fund case than in the transparent fund case.
The effects of ξ on the equilibrium are summarized in Corollary 3.1. Recall that ξ is
an endogenous composite parameter that increases with β and ηu and decreases with r
and ηv.
18That ξ can exceed unity is a major difference from Holmstro¨m’s (1999) result. The counterpart of
ξ in his paper is the LHS of Equation (22), which is never greater than one. That threshold is crucial
for his main result because it ensures that the labor supply is never greater than the efficient level in the
stationary state. The reason why ξ > 1 may occur in the model developed here is that the risky asset not
only yields δt but also can be sold at price Pt. This resale of the asset creates an additional component
(captured by the term (1− λ)/r in the definition of ξ in (3.13)) and allows ξ to be large.
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Corollary 3.1. The manager’s career concern ξ affects the price and the agents’ actions:
dP ∗∗/dξ > 0, dRˆ∗∗/dξ < 0, dX∗∗/dξ < 0, and dθ∗∗/dξ > 0.
The intuition is as follows. For a given Rˆ, a rise in ξ induces the manager to (secretly)
lever up and increase investment in the risky asset in an effort to boost next-period fund
return and thus inflate investor expectations about future fund returns (i.e., ∂θ/∂ξ > 0
given Rˆ). The investors are rational and are not fooled on the equilibrium path, but the
manager levers up nonetheless. Indeed, as in Holmstro¨m (1999) or Stein (1989), given
the investors’ beliefs that the manager will try to fool them, it is optimal for him to
do so for fear of being underestimated. This increase in θ then induces the investors to
invest more capital in the fund for a given Rˆ (i.e., ∂X/∂ξ > 0 given Rˆ) because, ceteris
paribus, a higher θ implies a higher expected fund return. Higher θ and X result in a
higher aggregate demand, θX, for a given Rˆ. In equilibrium, that demand is settled by
a higher market-clearing price and hence a lower expected return (i.e., dP ∗∗/dξ > 0 and
dRˆ∗∗/dξ < 0). Taking this price adjustment into account, the manager’s portfolio is still
riskier than the original level (dθ∗∗/dξ > 0); however, the negative effect of ξ on X∗∗
through Rˆ∗∗ dominates its positive effect through θ∗∗, and so the net effect is negative
(dX∗∗/dξ < 0).
It is interesting to see the impact of career concerns on social welfare. Corollary 3.2
shows that the effect is a negative one.
Corollary 3.2. In the stationary equilibrium of the opaque fund case,
1. the expected return on each investor’s investment is 1 + r, whereas each manager’s
one-period utility is UM∗∗ ≡ φX∗∗ − κθ∗∗2/2 = ((2− ξ)/ξ1/3)UM∗,
2. the manager’s career concern does not affect the investors’ expected return but
makes the manager worse off, that is, dUM∗∗/dξ < 0, and
3. the allocation is Pareto inferior (superior) to that of the transparent fund case if
ξ > 1 (ξ < 1).
The reason for dUM∗∗/dξ < 0 is that dX∗∗/dξ < 0 and dθ∗∗/dξ > 0, as shown in
Corollary 3.1. Intuitively, the manager is worse off because he attracts lower capital
(and thus lower fees) as he cannot commit to not fool the investors by using opacity.
Because each investor’s expected return is 1 + r in both transparent and opaque fund
cases, comparing the social welfare that results from these cases amounts to comparing
UM∗ and UM∗∗. It is clear that UM∗ ≷ UM∗∗ if and only if ξ ≷ 1. It may be surprising
22
that the transparent fund case is Pareto inferior when ξ < 1, because the transparent
fund managers could choose the opaque fund managers’ superior solution θ∗∗ while the
investors are directly observing the choices. This does not occur in equilibrium because
the asset’s price adjusts so that the action is no longer optimal for the managers (who are
price takers). Indeed, if in the transparent fund case all managers happened to choose θ∗∗
when ξ < 1, the resulting Rˆ would be so high that it would not be individually optimal
for each manager to stick with such a low θ∗∗.
Corollary 3.3. In the opaque fund case, if the risky asset were transparent (i.e., if δt
were observable to the investors), then no manager would buy that asset (i.e., θi,t = 0
∀i), and hence no equilibrium would exist under the conjectures specified in Section 3.1.
This result starkly differs from its counterpart in the transparent fund case (Corollary
2.2) due to a fundamental difference in the nature of maximization problems of transparent
and opaque fund managers. The transparent one does not have any career concern: he
chooses portfolio to maximize (in effect) his within-period utility, taking into account
the current investors’ best responses to his observable portfolio choice (see (2.4)). In
contrast, the opaque one is solely motivated by a career concern: he chooses portfolio
in an attempt to influence the future investors’ decisions, knowing that his unobservable
portfolio choice does not affect the current investors’ decisions (see (3.7)). If the risky asset
were transparent, the investors would observe Ht directly irrespective of the manager’s
actions, and hence the opaque fund manager’s career concern would be eliminated. Then
what remains would be the manager’s pure moral hazard: for any asset prices and for
any belief θ∗∗t ≥ 0 of the investors, the manager would optimally choose θi,t = 0 because
choosing θi,t > 0 is costly for him and yet does not affect the investors’ capital provision
(and therefore his fees) at all. In other words, if the asset were transparent, the second
term of the manager’s objective function (3.7) would disappear and only the cost −κθ2i,t/2
in the first term would remain; hence, his optimal choice would be θi,t = 0. So the only
possible situation in which the investors have a consistent belief would be that the manager
chooses θi,t = 0 and the investors believe θ
∗∗
t = 0. However, θi,t = 0 would not clear the
risky asset’s market, and thus there would be no such an equilibrium. If the opaque fund
manager could promise credibly to buy the transparent asset, he would do so because it
would attract more investor capital; however, a lack of commitment prevents him from
doing so. Corollaries 3.3 and 2.2 will be useful when understanding the working of the
models of Sections 4 and 5, where the transparent and opaque funds and assets coexist.
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4 Opacity Price Premium: Coexistence of Transparency
and Opacity
So far I have focused on models with extreme assumptions: there is only a single, opaque
risky asset, and the funds are either all transparent or all opaque. Do the insights gener-
ated by these models carry through in a more realistic setting in which various degrees of
opacity coexist? In this section, I present a model in which both transparent and opaque
funds, as well as transparent and opaque assets with identical payoffs, coexist. In equi-
librium, an “opacity price premium” arises: the opaque asset trades at a premium over
the transparent one, even though it is common knowledge that their payoffs are identical
and both assets are accessible to all funds. The opacity price premium is accompanied
by endogenous market segmentation: transparent funds purchase only transparent assets,
whereas opaque funds purchase only opaque assets.
4.1 Setup
The model setup used here is much like that used in Section 1. Unless otherwise noted,
the same assumptions prevail (see Appendix E for the details).
4.1.1 Risky assets
There are two risky assets, a and b, referred to (respectively) as the transparent and
opaque assets. The supply of asset a is piS and that of asset b is (1−pi)S, where pi ∈ (0, 1)
is taken to be exogenous in this section. In focusing on the role of opacity, I assume
that these two assets are identical in terms of their payoffs: in period t, they yield the
same payoff δt from the same distribution specified in Section 1. It is common knowledge
that these assets yield identical payoffs. Asset a’s payoff δt is directly observable only
to the agents in the funds that bought that asset in period t − 1.19 Asset b’s payoff
δt is never directly observable to the investors. Obviously, if a fund purchases asset a,
then the investors in that fund will learn asset b’s δt as well. Asset k ∈ {a, b} is traded
in the market at a publicly observable price P kt , and its excess return is denoted by
Rkt+1 ≡ δkt+1 +P kt+1− (1 + r)P kt . The expected excess return conditional on the true payoff
history Ht = (δ1, ..., δt) is Rˆkt+1 ≡ E[Rkt+1|Ht].
19A story behind this assumption is as follows. There are potentially a large number of transparent
assets that are ex ante distinguishable to the managers, but not to the investors. Hence, only if the
manager picks one particular asset from them the investors can track that asset’s periodic payoff.
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4.1.2 Funds
There is a measure-1 continuum of funds. An exogenous proportion α ∈ (0, 1) of them
are funds A, indexed by i ∈ [0, α), and the rest are funds B, indexed by i ∈ [α, 1]. Funds
A and B are referred to as the transparent and opaque funds, respectively. Note that
the funds’ types are not the managers’ choices but their inherent characteristics.20 Fund
j ∈ {A,B} with index i (“fund j-i”) consists of a manager (“manager j-i”) and a large
number of investors (“investors j-i”). The size of fund j-i in period t is Xji,t, which gives
the manager a fee of φXji,t but requires the fund to expend the management cost cX
j2
i,t .
4.1.3 Manager’s decisions
In each period, each manager makes two decisions. First, he chooses the type of risky
asset to hold in his fund portfolio. Second, he decides how much of that asset to purchase.
These are detailed as follows.
• Decision 1: asset class. I assume that each manager can form a portfolio consisting
of only one risky asset (i.e., either a or b) and the riskless asset. In each period t,
before Xji,t is determined, each manager chooses the type k ∈ {a, b} of the risky asset
he holds in his period-t portfolio. This choice is directly observable to the investors,
whether the fund is transparent or opaque.21 The choice of k is interpreted as a
fund’s choice of the asset classes it invests in. Choosing k = a can be viewed as
committing to focus on traditional, “plain vanilla” asset classes, whereas choosing
k = b can be interpreted as advertising that it will invest in more sophisticated,
complex financial instruments.
• Decision 2: portfolio. After choosing k ∈ {a, b}, manager j-i forms a portfolio:
for each dollar of investor capital, he purchases θjki,t ∈ [0,∞) shares of asset k and(
1 − P kt θjki,t
)
units of the riskless asset. In fund A-i, the manager’s portfolio θAki,t is
directly observable to investors A-i in period t, irrespective of k. In fund B-i, in
20In Section 5, I discuss the managers’ endogenous choice of fund types. See footnote 27 and the
corresponding discussion.
21Even if we allow each manager to choose to make this choice observable or unobservable, every
manager chooses to make it observable. A transparent fund manager is indifferent between observable
and unobservable choices because his portfolio is always observable to the investors. An opaque fund
manager strictly prefers to make it observable: if he instead chose to make it unobservable, then the
investors would not invest capital in the fund, anticipating rationally a moral hazard situation in which
the manager chooses k = a and then “shirks,” that is, invests no capital in asset a to avoid incurring the
personal cost of portfolio formation.
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contrast, the portfolio θBki,t is unobservable to investors B-i regardless of k, and the
manager cannot commit to his portfolio choice. As in Section 1, manager j-i incurs
a personal cost of portfolio formation: κθjk2i,t /2.
Note that, in fund B-i, the chosen asset class k ∈ {a, b} is observable, whereas the number
of shares of that asset purchased (i.e., θBki,t ∈ [0,∞)) is unobservable to the investors
regardless of k.
4.2 Equilibrium
Proposition 4.1 summarizes a long-run stationary equilibrium of this economy.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose there are both transparent and opaque assets, as well as
transparent and opaque funds. Assume the opaque fund managers’ career concerns satisfy
ξ ∈ (ξ`, 2), where ξ` ≡ (α/(1−α))1/2((1− pi)/pi)1/2. Then a stationary equilibrium exists.
On the equilibrium path,
1. all investors infer δt correctly, and all agents update the estimate of δ¯t by (1.2) with
λt = λ,
2. (Opacity price premium.) the prices of the transparent and opaque assets are,
respectively, P a∗(δˆt) = (δˆt − Rˆa∗)/r with Rˆa∗ = c(piS/α)1/3(κ/φ)2/3 and P b∗(δˆt) =
(δˆt − Rˆb∗)/r with Rˆb∗ = ξ2/3` ξ−2/3Rˆa∗, where P a∗(δˆt) < P b∗(δˆt),
3. the sizes of the transparent and opaque funds are, respectively, XA∗ = (piS/α)2/3 (κ/φ)1/3
and XB∗ = ξ4/3` ξ
−1/3XA∗,
4. (Market segmentation.) every transparent fund manager buys θAa∗ = (piSφ/(ακ))1/3
shares of the transparent asset per investor capital, and every opaque fund manager
buys θBb∗ = ξ2/3` ξ
1/3θAa∗ shares of the opaque asset per investor capital, and
5. the expected return on each investor’s investment is 1 + r, whereas the one-period
utilities of the transparent and opaque fund managers are, respectively, UMA∗ =
(κ1/3/2) (φpiS/α)2/3 and UMB∗ = ξ4/3` ξ
−1/3(2− ξ)UMA∗.
The equilibrium is supported by the investors’ out-of-equilibrium belief (E.8) specified in
Appendix E.2 (which is the obvious counterpart of (3.3)).
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The second part of Proposition 4.1 states that the opaque asset trades at a higher
price than does the transparent one in equilibrium, even though it is common knowledge
that these assets yield identical payoffs and each manager is allowed to buy whichever
risky asset he wishes. This result provides a theoretical support for the empirical findings
that opaque, complex financial instruments have been traded at a premium (Coval, Jurek,
and Stafford 2009; Henderson and Pearson 2011; Ce´le´rier and Valle´e 2013). The price gap
between the two asset types—the opacity price premium—is increasing in the extent of
the opaque fund managers’ career concerns, ξ. Importantly, this price gap accompanies
endogenous market segmentation: the transparent asset is purchased only by transparent
funds, whereas the opaque asset is purchased only by opaque funds. This segmentation is
consistent with the real-world observation that mutual funds with disclosed positions tend
to focus on traditional assets, whereas hedge funds with secretive positions often trade
opaque assets, such as complex derivatives. Indeed, from a sample of over 5,000 hedge
funds, Chen (2011) documents that 71% of them trade derivative securities, whereas Koski
and Pontiff (1999) find that only 21% of mutual funds in their sample use derivatives.
Moreover, as Chen (2011) points out, the result in Koski and Pontiff’s work (1999) implies
that many mutual funds do not use derivatives even if they are permitted to do so, because
nearly two-thirds of mutual funds are actually allowed to invest in derivatives (Deli and
Varma 2002). This is also consistent with the model’s result that funds A do not buy
asset b even if they could.
The economic intuition for the market segmentation (and the associated price gap) is
obtained by revisiting Corollaries 2.2 and 3.3. For a transparent fund manager, the risky
asset’s opacity is irrelevant because his fund’s investors infer the opaque asset’s payoff δt
correctly, regardless of whether it is on or off the equilibrium path, and thus there is no
scope for the manager to influence the investor assessment of his fund’s future prospect
by investing in the opaque asset (Corollary 2.2). Therefore, given that the opaque asset is
more expensive, he simply buys the cheaper transparent asset to attract investor capital.
In contrast, an opaque fund manager does not buy the transparent asset, even if it is
cheaper, due to a moral hazard problem and a lack of commitment (Corollary 3.3). Let us
see more carefully why opaque funds buy only the opaque asset despite the higher price.
First, consider what would happen if manager B-i chose k = a in period t. In this case,
investors B-i would directly observe the true value of δt+1 in period t + 1, regardless of
the θBai,t chosen. Hence, the manager would not be able to influence the future investors’
capital provisions, XBi,t+τ for τ = 1, 2, ..., by choosing θ
Ba
i,t > 0. Furthermore, because
investors B-i make decisions based on their beliefs about the manager’s (unobservable)
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choice of θBai,t , not on the θ
Ba
i,t actually chosen, the manager would not be able to affect the
current investors’ capital XBi,t by choosing θ
Ba
i,t > 0 either. Then because choosing θ
Ba
i,t > 0
has no impact on the investors’ capital provisions but is yet personally costly for him, it
would be optimal for the manager to choose θBai,t = 0. Clearly, this would give the investors
a negative rate of return. So, given that the manager chose k = a, the investors would not
invest any capital in the fund in that period (i.e., XBi,t = 0), anticipating that the manager
will choose θBai,t = 0. Because X
B
i,t = 0 yields no fees, the manager’s period-t utility when
choosing k = a would be zero. Of course, if the manager could make the investors believe
that θBai,t > 0, then X
B
i,t > 0 would be provided; however, a lack of commitment prevents
him from doing so.22 Next, consider what happens if the manager chooses k = b. In
this case, being motivated by a career concern, he can credibly purchase the opaque asset
(as in the model of Section 3), and the investors rationally anticipate that the manager
will indeed buy a positive number of shares of that asset (i.e., θBbi,t = θ
Bb∗ > 0). Thus,
the investors will provide a positive amount of capital to the fund (i.e., XBi,t > 0), which
yields a positive fee φXBi,t. As shown in the fifth part of Proposition 4.1, this fee leads the
manager to attain a positive utility level, even after the cost (i.e., UMB∗ > 0). Therefore,
the manager is better off purchasing the opaque asset than purchasing the transparent
one, even if it is more expensive.
Note that, for this equilibrium to exist, the degree of each opaque fund manager’s
career concern needs to be “moderate.” On the one hand, ξ must be small enough (ξ < 2)
to make the opaque fund managers willing to invest in the opaque asset rather than the
transparent asset (i.e., UMB∗ > 0). But, on the other hand, it must be large enough
(ξ > ξ`) to make these managers drive up the opaque asset’s price to the level at which
the transparent fund managers invest only in the transparent asset (i.e., P a∗ < P b∗).
Corollary 4.1 offers testable implications on the opacity price premium that are drawn
from Proposition 4.1.
Corollary 4.1. The overpricing of opaque assets is positively related to
1. the proportion of opaque funds: d(P b∗ − P a∗)/d(1− α) > 0, and
2. the volatility of the persistent component δ¯t of the risky assets’ periodic payoff:
d(P b∗ − P a∗)/d(η−1v ) > 0.
22For θBai,t = 0 to hold, the assumption that investors are short lived plays a role. If they were infinitely
lived and sufficiently patient, they could commit not to invest in the fund in the future if the fund return
reveals ex post that the manager chose θBai,t = 0, and thereby the manager would be incentivized to choose
θBai,t > 0. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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The first part of Corollary 4.1 indicates that the rapid growth in the hedge fund
industry in the past few decades may have driven the overpricing of opaque assets from
the demand side. Indeed, a large proportion (1−α) of opaque funds would be associated
with a large aggregate demand for the opaque asset and thus a high price of that asset,
leading to a large opacity price premium. The second part of the corollary predicts that the
overpricing is pronounced when financial assets with highly unpredictable payoffs prevail
in the market. This makes sense too. When the volatility η−1v of the periodic payoff’s
persistent component is high, the investors’ estimate δˆt tends to be highly inaccurate and
thus susceptible to manipulation; therefore, each opaque fund manager has a strong desire
to influence their estimate, leading to a large career concern ξ. This large ξ induces the
manager to lever up and invest aggressively in the opaque asset, driving up its price.
Proposition 4.1 focuses on an equilibrium in which opaque funds invest aggressively
in the risky asset compared with transparent funds. For this result, the assumption that
ξ is relatively large (ξ > ξ`) is critical. Then what happens if ξ ≤ ξ` instead?
Proposition 4.2. Suppose there are both transparent and opaque assets, as well as
transparent and opaque funds. Assume the opaque fund managers’ career concerns satisfy
ξ ≤ ξ`. Then a stationary equilibrium exists. On the equilibrium path,
1. all investors infer δt correctly, and all agents update the estimate of δ¯t by (1.2) with
λt = λ,
2. the prices of the transparent and opaque assets are equal: P a∗(δˆt) = P b∗(δˆt) =
(δˆt − Rˆ∗)/r, where Rˆ∗ = c (κ/φ)2/3 (S/((1− α)ξ2 + α))1/3 ,
3. the sizes of the transparent and opaque funds are, respectively,
XA∗ = (κ/φ)1/3 (S/((1− α)ξ2 + α))2/3 and XB∗ = ξXA∗,
4. a fraction ω∗ = pi (1 + ξ2(1− α)/α) ∈ (0, 1] of transparent fund managers buy θA∗ =
(Sφ/(κ ((1− α)ξ2 + α)))1/3 shares of the transparent asset per investor capital, and
the rest of them buy θA∗ shares of the opaque asset per investor capital. Every
opaque fund manager buys θBb∗ = ξθA∗ shares of the opaque asset per investor
capital, and
5. the expected return on each investor’s investment is 1 + r, while the one-period
utilities of the transparent and opaque fund managers are, respectively, UMA∗ =
(κ1/3/2) (Sφ/((1− α)ξ2 + α))2/3 and UMB∗ = ξ(2− ξ)UMA∗, where UMA∗ ≥ UMB∗.
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The equilibrium is supported by the investors’ out-of-equilibrium belief (E.8) specified in
Appendix E.2.
Proposition 4.2 states that if ξ ≤ ξ`, then the opacity price premium vanishes, that
is, P a∗ = P b∗. Moreover, market segmentation does not occur: although all opaque funds
buy the opaque asset, only a fraction ω∗ ∈ (0, 1] of transparent funds buy the transparent
asset, and the rest of them buy the opaque asset.23 This result underscores that the
opacity price premium arises only if the opaque fund manager’s career concern is strong
enough. The result’s intuition is as follows. If all funds A purchased asset a and all funds
B purchased asset b (as in Proposition 4.1), then the demand of funds B for asset b is so
weak (because ξ is small) that P a > P b would hold. But P a > P b could not be sustained
in equilibrium because fund-A managers—for whom asset’s opacity is irrelevant—flock to
the cheaper asset b until P a = P b holds. This equality pins down ω∗. Fund-B managers
buy only asset b because the commitment problem prevents them from buying asset a.
4.3 Graphical analysis
Although the model’s solutions are all expressed in closed form, a graphical representa-
tion helps us grasp the big picture of the equilibrium. Figure 1 plots the model’s key
endogenous variables versus the opaque fund manager’s career concern ξ (which itself is
an endogenous composite parameter defined in (3.13)). The parameter values used in the
figure are α = 0.44, pi = 0.92, c = 1, δˆt = 4, S = 1, κ = 0.1, φ = 0.02, and r = 0.04.
In choosing the values of α and pi, I consider mutual funds as an example of transparent
funds; hedge funds as an example of opaque funds; stocks as an example of transparent
assets; and structured products as an example of opaque assets. According to Investment
Company Institute, there were 7,555 mutual funds in 2010, whereas there were around
9,500 hedge funds in 2010, according to TheCityUK. Thus, I set α = 7,555
7,555+9,500
= 0.44.
As for pi, because of the limited availability of data, I use the relative market size of stocks
and structured products in Europe as a proxy. The World Bank reports that the market
capitalization of the companies listed on the stock exchanges in the European Union in
2010 is EUR 7,985 billion. According to Ce´le´rier and Valle´e (2013), the total value of out-
standing structured tranche products in Europe as of December 2010 is EUR 704 billion.
So, I set pi = 7,985
7,985+704
= 0.92.
23Here, note that none of the funds buys both assets a and b because, by assumption of Decision 1,
each fund is allowed to buy only one risky asset. That is, there is a measure ω∗α of transparent funds
buying only asset a and (1− ω∗)α of them buying only asset b.
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Figure 1: Fixed supply model. The graphs plot the key endogenous variables versus
the opaque fund manager’s career concern, ξ. Note that ξ is an endogenous composite
parameter that increases with β and ηu and decreases with r and ηv. The parameter
values used in the graphs are pi = 0.92, α = 0.44, c = 1, δˆt = 4, S = 1, κ = 0.1, φ = 0.02,
and r = 0.04.
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Figure 1(a) plots the assets’ prices. For ξ ≤ ξ`, P a and P b are equal. P b increases
with ξ because the opaque funds’ demand increases with ξ. P a also increases with ξ due
to the increased demand pressure from the transparent funds that flee from the opaque
asset and flock to the transparent asset (i.e., ω increases with ξ). For ξ > ξ`, the market
is totally segmented: only funds A buy asset a and only funds B buy asset b. So only
P b is increasing in ξ due to the opaque funds’ demand, and therefore the opacity price
premium increases with ξ.
Figure 1(b) plots the fund’s leverage ratio, defined as the amount of borrowing (PθX−
X) divided by capital X; that is, L = (PθX−X)/X = Pθ−1. The opaque fund’s leverage
ratio LB rises sharply with ξ because (1) the opaque asset’s price P b rises and (2) the
manager purchases a larger number of shares of the asset per investor capital (i.e., θBb
increases).
Figure 1(c) shows XB < XA for all ξ, consistent with the empirical observation that
the asset size of each hedge fund tends to be much smaller than that of mutual fund.24 To
see the intuition, recall that the fund size is increasing in the expected return on the fund
portfolio, Rˆθ (see (2.3) and (3.4)). Because the opaque funds’ return is lower than the
transparent funds’ (because they purchase the expensive opaque asset), they attract fewer
investor capital. For ξ ≤ ξ`, XA decreases with ξ because the transparent fund’s return
decreases as Rˆa and θAa both decrease. In contrast, XB increases with ξ for ξ ≤ ξ` because
the opaque fund manager increases θBb so much that its positive effect on XB outweighs
the negative effect of a decrease in Rˆb on XB. For ξ > ξ`, however, X
B decreases with ξ
because Rˆb decreases so much (due to the sharp rise in P b) that it exceeds the positive
effect of a rise in θBb. Figure 1(d) shows that the manager’s one-period utility follows the
similar pattern as Figure 1(c) because her fee revenue is proportional to the fund size.
5 Endogenous Supply of Opaque Assets
Why do opaque assets emerge in the first place? To address this question, I make one
modification to the model of Section 4: the opaque asset is endogenously supplied by
a new set of competitive agents called financial engineers. That is, pi is endogenously
determined in this section. The engineers not only trade the two risky assets but also
24The total assets of mutual funds in 2010 are USD 11,832 billion, according to Investment Company
Institute, whereas those of hedge funds are USD 1,920 billion, according to TheCityUK. Thus, dividing
them by the number of funds, each mutual fund’s average size is USD 1.56 billion, whereas that of the
hedge fund is only USD 0.19 billion.
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(costlessly) transform transparent assets into opaque assets and vice versa. I assume there
are S > 0 shares of the transparent asset and none of the opaque asset in the beginning
of period 0; afterward, the engineers competitively trade and transform the assets.
The engineers effectively act as arbitrageurs who exploit the opacity price premium:
as long as the opaque asset’s price is higher the engineers will buy the transparent asset,
make it opaque, and sell (i.e., supply) it at a profit. Because the prices of transparent
and opaque assets are decreasing in their supplies (see Proposition 4.1), the engineers
should continue transforming the assets until the price gap is closed.25 Thus, the equality
P a∗ = P b∗ pins down the stationary level of pi.
Proposition 5.1 summarizes the long-run stationary equilibrium of this economy.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose transparent and opaque funds coexist and financial engineers
supply the opaque asset. Assume the opaque fund managers’ career concerns satisfy ξ < 2.
Then a stationary equilibrium exists. On the equilibrium path,
1. all investors infer δt correctly, and all agents update the estimate of δ¯t by (1.2) with
λt = λ,
2. the number of shares of the opaque asset supplied by the engineers is (1−pi∗)S and
that of the transparent asset is pi∗S, where pi∗ = α/((1− α)ξ2 + α),
3. the prices of the transparent and opaque assets are equal: P a∗(δˆt) = P b∗(δˆt) =
(δˆt − Rˆ∗)/r, where Rˆ∗ = c (κ/φ)2/3 (S/((1− α)ξ2 + α))1/3 ,
4. the sizes of the transparent and opaque funds are, respectively,
XA∗ = (κ/φ)1/3 (S/((1− α)ξ2 + α))2/3 and XB∗ = ξXA∗,
5. every transparent fund manager buys θAa∗ = (Sφ/(κ ((1− α)ξ2 + α)))1/3 shares of
the transparent asset per investor capital, and every opaque fund manager buys
θBb∗ = ξθAa∗ shares of the opaque asset per investor capital, and
6. the expected return on each investor’s investment is 1 + r, whereas the one-period
utilities of the transparent and opaque fund managers are, respectively, UMA∗ =
(κ1/3/2) (Sφ/((1− α)ξ2 + α))2/3 and UMB∗ = ξ(2− ξ)UMA∗, where UMA∗ ≥ UMB∗.
The equilibrium is supported by the investors’ out-of-equilibrium belief (E.8) specified in
Appendix E.2.
25Here, the price gap is closed completely because the engineers’ asset transformation is costless. If
instead it is costly, then the gap would remain positive, reflecting the transformation cost. I thank an
anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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An insight drawn from this model is that opacity is self-feeding in financial markets.
Given the opacity price premium, the engineers try to exploit it by supplying the opaque
asset, but that asset becomes a source of agency problems in portfolio delegation, resulting
in the opacity price premium.
It is worth noting that the expressions of P , Rˆ, X, θ, and UM in Proposition 5.1 are
identical to those of Proposition 4.2. This makes sense. In Proposition 4.2, the fraction ω
of transparent funds that buy the transparent asset adjusts in equilibrium so that P a = P b
holds. In Proposition 5.1, the supply piS of the transparent asset adjusts until P a = P b
holds. Although the mechanisms are different, these cases achieve the same price level,
leading to the same equilibrium actions and utility levels.
Figure 2 plots the key endogenous variables versus ξ for the same parameter values as
Figure 1. Unlike Figure 1, there are no kinks on the graphs because the financial engineers
exploit the opacity price premium and “smooth out” the potential regime change that
would have occurred at a certain threshold level of ξ (i.e., ξ` in Section 4). Because of
the similarity between Propositions 4.2 and 5.1, Figure 2 can be viewed as the low-ξ part
of Figure 1 extended to the entire range of ξ. Thus, the economic intuitions for Figure 2
are similar to those for the low-ξ part of Figure 1 discussed in Section 4.3.
Proposition 5.1 implies that it is only in the knife-edge case ξ = 1 that the agents’
actions and utilities are identical between transparent and opaque funds. Regarding the
actions, XB∗ ≷ XA∗ and θBb∗ ≷ θAa∗ if ξ ≷ 1. As for the managers’ utilities, interestingly,
UMA∗ > UMB∗, as long as ξ 6= 1, regardless of whether ξ > 1 or ξ < 1.26 This means that
if the managers were allowed to choose the type of funds (i.e., if α were endogeneized),
then all of them would choose to be transparent (i.e., α = 1). This somewhat unappealing
feature could be eliminated if we assume that transparency comes at a cost: if disclosing
θi,t to investors requires a periodic cost q > 0, then an interior solution of α could be
obtained from the managers’ indifference condition.27 The disclosure cost q can be inter-
preted as representing hedge funds’ benefits of being opaque—which they would lose if
26For this result, convexity of the manager’s personal cost plays a role. If ξ > 1, then XA∗ < XB∗
and θAa∗ < θBb∗. Thus, clearly φXA∗ < φXB∗. Nevertheless, UMA∗ > UMB∗ holds because 12κθ
Aa∗2 is
much lower than 12κθ
Bb∗2 because of convexity. On the other, if ξ < 1, then φXA∗ > φXB∗. Because
1
2κθ
Aa∗2 is not so higher than 12κθ
Bb∗2 because of convexity, UMA∗ > UMB∗ holds again.
27Suppose that each manager is allowed to choose the fund’s type and that each transparent fund
manager needs to pay a periodic disclosure cost q > 0. In equilibrium, all managers should be indifferent
between the two fund types, that is, UMA∗−q = UMB∗ must hold. Solving this condition for α, we obtain
its equilibrium value: α∗ = 11−ξ2
(
Sφ
(
(1−ξ)2κ1/3
2q
)3/2
− ξ2
)
. Choosing the parameter values properly,
we can ensure that α∗ ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 2: Endogenous supply model. The parameter values used in the graphs are α =
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becoming transparent—that are not captured in the model. For example, disclosure of
hedge funds’ positions could expose these funds to front running and predatory trading,
and also “could allow others to infer their trading strategies and information, inducing
mimicking trade which could erode the profitability of strategies (Easley, O’Hara, and
Yang 2012).”28 Indeed, Aragon, Hertzel, and Shi (2013) find empirical evidence that con-
fidentiality of hedge funds’ positions allows them to earn positive and significant abnormal
returns.
Last, the next corollary offers testable implications on the supply of opaque assets.
Corollary 5.1. The supply of opaque asset is positively related to
1. the proportion of opaque funds: d(1− pi∗)/d(1− α) > 0, and
2. the volatility of the persistent component δ¯t of the underlying asset’s periodic payoff:
d(1− pi∗)/d(η−1v ) > 0.
The intuition for Corollary 5.1 is closely related to that for Corollary 4.1. A large
proportion (1−α) of opaque funds and/or a large volatility η−1v of the persistent component
of the underlying asset’s payoff would be associated with a large opacity price premium
(absent engineers), which requires a large number of shares of the opaque asset to be
eliminated. Note that the opaque asset’s price P b∗ increases with ξ, even though the
supply (1−pi∗)S increases with ξ, because the aggregate demand (1−α)θBb∗XB∗ is more
increasing with ξ. Similarly for the transparent asset, P a∗ increases with ξ, whereas the
aggregate demand αθAa∗XA∗ decreases with ξ because the supply pi∗S is more decreasing
with ξ.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a dynamic equilibrium model of delegated portfolio management to
study the implications of opacity in financial markets for investor behavior, asset prices,
and welfare. Opacity creates agency problems in portfolio delegation, leading to exces-
sively high fund leverage and lower welfare. An opaque asset’s price is driven up as the
fund managers’ career concerns become stronger, since opacity potentially allows them to
collect higher fees by manipulating investor assessments of their funds’ future prospects.
This is so even though investors are not fooled in equilibrium. When opacity and trans-
parency coexist, opaque assets trade at a premium over transparent assets despite it
28I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these interpretations of the disclosure cost.
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is common knowledge that the respective asset types yield identical payoffs; this is the
opacity price premium. This price gap is accompanied by endogenous market segmen-
tation: transparent funds trade only transparent assets, and opaque funds trade only
opaque assets. The opacity price premium is exploited by financial engineers, capable of
transforming transparent assets into opaque ones. In that sense, opacity is self-feeding:
engineers exploit the opacity price premium by supplying opaque assets, which in turn
are the source of agency problems (in portfolio delegation) that result in a premium for
opacity.
A limitation of this paper is that it focuses on competitive equilibria of liquid financial
markets while in reality a significant proportion of complex assets are traded in over-the-
counter markets (where asset prices are not made public) or thin markets (where investors
have price impact). It will be fruitful for future research to explore the implications of
opacity based on a search-based model of OTC markets (e.g., Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and
Pedersen 2005) or a double-auction model of thin markets (e.g., Kyle 1989).
In this paper, opacity arises for its own sake—that is, it is created by engineers for the
sole purpose of obfuscating the asset’s true payoffs. This extreme way of modeling is useful
for understanding one aspect of opacity. Naturally it is also important to consider other,
more positive views on opaque assets. For instance, opacity may be a minor side effect
associated with sophisticated financial techniques to achieve better risk sharing. Future
research exploring this possible trade-off would be both interesting and important.
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Appendix
A Fund Manager’s Nonpecuniary Cost as a Reduced
Form of Risk Aversion
This section shows that the manager’s nonpecuniary cost κθ2i,t/2 can be interpreted as a reduced form of
his risk aversion because it endogenously arises in a slightly modified model setting.
Consider a setting with the following two modifications.
1. Fund i’s management cost is ci,tX
2
i,t, where ci,t ∈ (0,∞) is stochastic, i.i.d. across funds and also
across time. The realization of ci,t is after θi,t is chosen by manager i but before Xi,t is determined
by investors i. (The timing assumption that Xi,t is determined after θi,t is chosen would not
affect any results of the model in the main text.) For notational simplicity, define two constants:
c ≡ E [c−1i,t ]−1 and σ2c ≡ Var [c−1i,t ]−1 . Note that, because there is a continuum of funds,∫ 1
0
1
ci,t
di = E
[
1
ci,t
]
=
1
c
(A.1)
holds by the law of large numbers. This relation plays an important role later in this section.
2. The manager’s per-period objective is a mean-variance function of his fee revenue:
E[φXi,t]− ν
2
Var[φXi,t], (A.2)
where ν > 0 represents the degree of his risk aversion.
Now, conjecture (and later verify) that Rˆt+1 is a positive constant Rˆ in equilibrium. Then, as in
(2.3), Xi,t is determined as
Xi,t =
1
ci,t
Rˆθi,t. (A.3)
So, by (A.2) and (A.3), the manager’s period-t objective is rewritten as
E [φXi,t]− ν
2
Var
[
φ
1
ci,t
Rˆθi,t
]
= E [φXi,t]− 1
2
(
νφ2Rˆ2
σ2c
)
θ2i,t = E [φXi,t]−
κ
2
θ2i,t, (A.4)
where κ ≡ νφ2Rˆ2/σ2c . Thus, (1.1) can be viewed as a reduced form of this risk-aversion formulation with
the constant νφ2Rˆ2/σ2c replaced by κ.
Last, I verify that Rˆt+1 is indeed nonstochastic in equilibrium. Using (A.3) again, the manager’s
objective (A.4) is further rewritten as
E
[
φ
1
ci,t
Rˆθi,t
]
− κ
2
θ2i,t =
φ
c
Rˆθi,t − κ
2
θ2i,t. (A.5)
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The manager’s choice of θi,t that maximizes (A.5) is, for all i and t,
θi,t =
φ
cκ
Rˆ. (A.6)
Using (A.3) and (A.6), the risky asset’s market clearing condition is∫ 1
0
θi,tXi,tdi = S ⇐⇒
∫ 1
0
φ
cκ
Rˆ
1
ci,t
Rˆ
φ
cκ
Rˆdi = S ⇐⇒ φ
2
c2κ2
Rˆ3
∫ 1
0
1
ci,t
di = S
⇐⇒ φ
2
c3κ2
Rˆ3 = S, (A.7)
where the last line follows from (A.1). From (A.7), it is verified that Rˆt+1 is indeed nonstochastic:
Rˆ = cS1/3
(
κ
φ
)2/3
. (A.8)
Observe that the expression of (A.8) is identical to (2.6).
B Derivation of (1.3)
Let η−t ≡ 1/Var(δ¯t|Ht−1) be the precision of the managers’ estimate of δ¯t before observing δt, and
η+t ≡ 1/Var(δ¯t|Ht) be the precision after observing δt. By standard Kalman filtering, a new observation
of δt will update the estimate of δ¯t as δˆt = λtδˆt−1 + (1− λt)δt with λt ≡ η−t /η+t , where
η+t = η
−
t + ηu. (B.1)
Take Var(·|Ht) to δ¯t+1 = δ¯t + vt+1. By normality and independence,
1
η−t+1
=
1
η+t
+
1
ηv
⇐⇒ η−t+1 =
η+t ηv
η+t + ηv
⇐⇒ η−t+1 =
(η−t + ηu)ηv
η−t + ηu + ηv
. (B.2)
Meanwhile, from the definition of λt it follows that
λt =
η−t
η−t + ηu
⇐⇒ η−t = ηu
λt
1− λt . (B.3)
Plugging (B.3) into (B.2) and then rearranging yields (1.3):
ηu
λt+1
1− λt+1 =
(
ηu
λt
1−λt + ηu
)
ηv
ηu
λt
1−λt + ηu + ηv
⇐⇒ λt+1 = 1
2 + ηuηv − λt
.
The updating factor λt is the same for (1.2) and (1.5). This is shown as follows. Let η
I−
i,t ≡ 1/Var(δ¯t|HIi,t−1)
be the precision of the investors i’s estimate of δ¯t before inferring δt (i.e., before having the value of δ
I
i,t),
and ηI+i,t ≡ 1/Var(δ¯t|HIi,t) be the precision after inferring δt. As in (B.1), the relation between ηI+i,t and
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ηI−i,t is
ηI+i,t = η
I−
i,t + ηu. (B.4)
Because H0 = HIi,0 (i.e., they are empty sets in period 0), ηI−i,0 = η−0 for all i. Given this, (B.1) and (B.4)
imply that ηI+i,t = η
+
t and η
I−
i,t = η
−
t for all i and t. Thus, we have η
I−
i,t /η
I+
i,t = η
−
t /η
+
t = λt, as required.
C Proof of Lemma 3.1
First, I determine the size of fund i on an off-the-equilibrium path where manager i is deviating from the
equilibrium strategy.
Lemma C.1. If manager i plays (θi,0, θi,1, ...) when investors i believe that he plays (θ
∗∗
0 , θ
∗∗
1 , ...), then
the size of fund i in period t = 1, 2, ... is Xi,t = Xt +X
+
i,t, where
Xt ≡ 1
c
Rˆt+1θ
∗∗
t (C.1)
and X+i,t ≡
θ∗∗t
c
(
1 +
1− λt+1
r
) t∑
s=1
(
t∏
ν=s+1
λν
)
(1− λs)
(
θi,s−1 − θ∗∗s−1
θ∗∗s−1
)
Rs.
29 (C.2)
Proof of Lemma C.1: To prove Lemma C.1, I prove the following two claims.
Claim 1: If investors i believe that the payoff history up to period t is HIi,t = (δIi,1, ..., δIi,t), then the
estimate of investors i in an arbitrary period t is
δˆIi,t = δˆt +
t∑
s=1
(
t∏
ν=s+1
λν
)
(1− λs)(δIi,s − δs).
Proof of Claim 1: For t = 0, we have δˆIi,0 = δˆ0 (exogenous). For t = 1, using the updating rule (1.5),
δˆIi,1 =λ1δˆ0 + (1− λ1)δIi,1
=λ1δˆ0 + (1− λ1)δ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
δˆ1
+ (1− λ1)(δIi,1 − δ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
misperception
=δˆ1 + (1− λ1)(δIi,1 − δ1).
For t = 2,
δˆIi,2 =λ2δˆ
I
i,1 + (1− λ2)δIi,2
=λ2
(
δˆ1 + (1− λ1)(δIi,1 − δ1)
)
+ (1− λ2)δ2 + (1− λ2)(δIi,2 − δ2)
=λ2δˆ1 + (1− λ2)δ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
δˆ2
+λ2(1− λ1)(δIi,1 − δ1) + (1− λ2)(δIi,2 − δ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
misperception
=δˆ2 + λ2(1− λ1)(δIi,1 − δ1) + (1− λ2)(δIi,2 − δ2).
29In (C.2), I abuse notation and set
∏t
ν=t+1 λν ≡ 1.
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Continuing this way, for an arbitrary t, we have
δˆIi,t = δˆt + λtλt−1 · · ·λ2(1− λ1)(δIi,1 − δ1)
+ λtλt−1 · · ·λ3(1− λ2)(δIi,2 − δ2)
...
+ λt(1− λt−1)(δIi,t−1 − δt−1)
+ (1− λt)(δIi,t − δt)
= δˆt +
t∑
s=1
(
t∏
ν=s+1
λν
)
(1− λs)(δIi,s − δs),
where (abusing notation somewhat) I set
∏t
ν=t+1 λν ≡ 1. (End of proof of Claim 1.)
Claim 2: Investors i’s expected excess return on the risky asset is
RˆIi,t+1 = Rˆt+1 +
(
1 +
1− λt+1
r
)
(δˆIi,t − δˆt). (C.3)
Proof of Claim 2: Using (3.1) and (1.5), the risky asset’s excess return is written as
Rt+1 ≡δt+1 + Pt+1 − (1 + r)Pt
=δt+1 +
1
r
∫ 1
0
δˆIi,t+1 di− γt+1 − (1 + r)Pt
=δt+1 +
1
r
∫ 1
0
(
λt+1δˆ
I
i,t + (1− λt+1)δIi,t+1
)
di− γt+1 − (1 + r)Pt
=δt+1 +
1− λt+1
r
∫ 1
0
δIi,t+1 di+
λt+1
r
δˆIt − γt+1 − (1 + r)Pt.
Thus, the expected excess return conditional on the true payoff history Ht is
Rˆt+1 ≡ E[Rt+1|Ht] =
(
1 +
1− λt+1
r
)
δˆt +
λt+1
r
δˆIt − γt+1 − (1 + r)Pt. (C.4)
Similarly, investors i’s expected excess return (conditional on their inferred history HIi,t) is
RˆIi,t+1 ≡ E[Rt+1|FIi,t] =
(
1 +
1− λt+1
r
)
δˆIi,t +
λt+1
r
δˆIt − γt+1 − (1 + r)Pt. (C.5)
From (C.4) and (C.5) we obtain
RˆIi,t+1 = Rˆt+1 +
(
1 +
1− λt+1
r
)
(δˆIi,t − δˆt),
as required. (End of proof of Claim 2.)
Claim 2 shows that an overestimation of δ¯t (i.e., δˆ
I
i,t > δˆt) leads to an overestimation of the excess
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return (i.e., RˆIi,t+1 > Rˆt+1). Now Claims 1 and 2 can be used to rearrange the fund size (3.4) as follows:
Xi,t =
1
c
RˆIi,t+1θ
∗∗
t
=
1
c
Rˆt+1θ
∗∗
t +
θ∗∗t
c
(RˆIi,t+1 − Rˆt+1)
=
1
c
Rˆt+1θ
∗∗
t +
θ∗∗t
c
(
1 +
1− λt+1
r
)
(δˆIi,t − δˆt)
=
1
c
Rˆt+1θ
∗∗
t +
θ∗∗t
c
(
1 +
1− λt+1
r
) t∑
s=1
(
t∏
ν=s+1
λν
)
(1− λs)(δIi,s − δs). (C.6)
Substituting (3.6) into (C.6) then yields
Xi,t =
1
c
Rˆt+1θ
∗∗
t +
θ∗∗t
c
(
1 +
1− λt+1
r
) t∑
s=1
(
t∏
ν=s+1
λν
)
(1− λs)
(
θi,s−1 − θs−1
θs−1
)
Rs
=Xt +X
+
i,t,
as we wanted. (End of proof of Lemma C.1.)
Lemma C.1 shows that the fund size Xi,t is the sum of two terms. The first, (C.1), is the size on the
equilibrium path. The second, (C.2), is an additional component on the off-the-equilibrium paths where
the manager is deviating. (This term is zero on the equilibrium path because θi,s−1 = θ∗∗s−1 holds for all
s.) From the manager’s perspective, the equilibrium fund size (C.1) is independent of his actions and
is thus uncontrollable. Hence, the impact of his actions (θi,0, ..., θi,t−1) on the current fund size Xi,t is
summarized in the off-equilibrium component (C.2). Given that Rs > 0 for s ≤ t, the investors invest
additional X+i,t > 0 dollars of capital in the fund in period t after the manager’s deviation θi,s−1 > θ
∗∗
s−1
in period s − 1. As is clear from (3.4), this additional capital investment is caused by an overshoot
in the investors’ expectation of excess return (i.e., RˆIi,t+1 > Rˆt+1). The key for this to occur is the
investors’ out-of-equilibrium belief (3.3), which leads the investors to stick by their own estimate of δ¯t
when it disagrees with the all investors’ average estimate δˆIt implied by the price. Note that, on this
off-the-equilibrium path, investors i are aware that δˆIi,t is higher than δˆ
I
t , but are unaware that it is too
high: they (incorrectly) believe that δˆIi,t is more accurate than δˆ
I
t . As shown in (C.3), this overestimation
of δ¯t leads to an overshoot in the expectation of Rt+1. Intuitively, the investors’ high estimate of δ¯t leads
them to expect both δt+1 and Pt+1 to be high; given the observed current price Pt, these estimates lead
them to expect that Rt+1 will also be high.
Now I prove Lemma 3.1. To simplify the manager’s period-t objective, note the following points.
• The fee generated by the current fund size, φXi,t, can be omitted from the original objective
function (1.1) because, from (3.4), Xi,t is independent of the manager’s actual choice of θi,t.
• By Lemma C.1, the future fund size Xi,t+τ (τ = 1, 2, ...) is linear in Xt+τ and X+i,t+τ . Because
(1.1) is linear in Xi,t+τ , it follows that (1.1) is linear in Xt+τ and X
+
i,t+τ . This implies that Xt+τ
can be omitted from (1.1) because the manager cannot influence Xt+τ by his choice of θi,t. That
is, only X+i,t+τ is relevant for his choice of θi,t.
• Conjecture (3.2)—which is verified later—implies that the manager’s current action (θi,t) does not
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affect his own future actions (θi,t+1, θi,t+2, ...), both on and off the equilibrium path. Thus, his
personal costs of forming future portfolios can be omitted from (1.1).
Taking these points into account, the manager’s period-t maximization problem reduces to
max
θi,t∈[0,∞)
−κ
2
θ2i,t + E
[ ∞∑
τ=1
βτφX+i,t+τ
∣∣∣∣FMi,t
]
,
where X+i,t+τ =
θ∗∗t+τ
c
(
1 +
1− λt+τ+1
r
) t+τ∑
s=1
(
t+τ∏
ν=s+1
λν
)
(1− λs)
(
θi,s−1 − θ∗∗s−1
θ∗∗s−1
)
Rs. (C.7)
Because X+i,t+τ is a linear function of (θi,0, ..., θi,t+τ−1), the marginal effect of the manager’s current
action θi,t on X
+
i,t+τ is independent of his actions in other periods, (θi,0, ..., θi,t−1, θi,t+1, ..., θi,t+τ−1).
Hence, in X+i,t+τ given by (C.7), only the term corresponding to s = t + 1 is relevant for the problem.
Thus, an equivalent problem is
max
θi,t∈[0,∞)
−κ
2
θ2i,t + E
[ ∞∑
τ=1
βτφ
θ∗∗t+τ
c
(
1 +
1− λt+τ+1
r
)( t+τ∏
ν=t+2
λν
)
(1− λt+1)
(
θi,t − θ∗∗t
θ∗∗t
)
Rt+1
∣∣∣∣FMi,t
]
.
This is rewritten as
max
θi,t∈[0,∞)
−κ
2
θ2i,t +
φ
c
(
θi,t − θ∗∗t
θ∗∗t
)
ΩtRˆt+1,
where Ωt ≡ (1− λt+1)
∞∑
τ=1
βτθ∗∗t+τ
(
1 +
1− λt+τ+1
r
)( t+τ∏
ν=t+2
λν
)
.
D Derivation of (3.12)
By the definition of Ωt,
Ωt = (1− λt+1)
∞∑
τ=1
βτ
( t+τ∏
ν=t+2
λν
)
Mt+τ , where Mt+τ ≡ θ∗∗t+τ
(
1 +
1− λt+τ+1
r
)
.
Then, noting that
∏t+1
ν=t+2 λν ≡ 1, we have
Ωt
1− λt+1 =βMt+1 + β
2λt+2Mt+2 + β
3λt+2λt+3Mt+3 + β
4λt+2λt+3λt+4Mt+4 + · · · ,
Ωt+1
1− λt+2 =βMt+2 + β
2λt+3Mt+3 + β
3λt+3λt+4Mt+4 + · · · .
From these two equations it follows that
Ωt
1− λt+1 = βMt+1 + βλt+2
Ωt+1
1− λt+2 .
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In the stationary state when t→∞, this relation becomes
Ω∗
1− λ = βθ
∗
(
1 +
1− λ
r
)
+ βλ
Ω∗
1− λ.
Rearranging, we have
Ω∗ = ξθ∗, where ξ ≡
(
1 +
1− λ
r
)
β(1− λ)
1− βλ .
E Proof of Proposition 4.1
E.1 Setup
First, I present some model details that are omitted in the main text (because of their obvious analogy
to those in Section 1).
Manager j-i’s maximization problem in period t, denoted PMji,t , is choosing k ∈ {a, b} and θjki,t ∈ [0,∞)
to maximize
E
[ ∞∑
τ=0
βτ
(
φXji,t+τ −
κ
2
θjk2i,t+τ
) ∣∣∣∣FMji,t
]
,
where FMji,t =
{
Y ji,τ , X
j
i,τ , θ
jk
i,τ , P
a
τ , P
b
τ , δτ : τ ≤ t
}
is the manager’s information set in period t. Let Ijkt be
the set of index i such that manager j-i chooses asset class k in period t.
The investors’ information sets, which include variables that are directly observable to them, are as
follows.
Investors A-i: FIAi,t =
{
δτ iff manager A-i chose k = a in period τ − 1, Y Ai,τ , XAi,τ , θAki,τ , P kτ : τ ≤ t
}
.
Investors B-i: FIBi,t =
{
δτ iff manager B-i chose k = a in period τ − 1, Y Bi,τ , XBi,τ , P kτ : τ ≤ t
}
.
Only for investors A-i, we can alternatively use FIAi,t =
{
δτ , Y
A
i,τ , X
A
i,τ , θ
Ak
i,τ , P
k
τ : τ ≤ t
}
because they can
always infer δt correctly regardless of the manager’s actions.
The equilibrium consists of the price function P kt (δˆt), the fund size X
j
i,t, and the manager’s portfolio
θjki,t for i ∈ [0, 1], j = A,B, and k = a, b such that, for all t, the following statements hold.
1. Given P kt (δˆt) and the others’ actions, each investor optimally allocates her endowment between
the fund and the riskless asset.
2. Given P kt (δˆt) and the others’ actions, manager j-i solves PMji,t .
3. The risky assets’ markets clear.
Asset a:
∫
i∈IAat
θAai,t X
A
i,t di+
∫
i∈IBat
θBai,t X
B
i,t di = piS. (E.1)
Asset b:
∫
i∈IAbt
θAbi,tX
A
i,t di+
∫
i∈IBbt
θBbi,tX
B
i,t di = (1− pi)S. (E.2)
4. Every agent has correct beliefs about the other agents’ actions.
5. Each agent updates the estimate of δ¯t via Kalman filtering.
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Denote by HIji,t ≡ (δIji,1, ..., δIji,t) the payoff history believed by investors j-i, where δIji,t is the value of
δt that they believe. These investors’ estimate of δ¯t is δˆ
Ij
i,t ≡ E[δ¯t|FIji,t ], and their conditional expectation
of the excess return on asset k ∈ {a, b} is RˆIjki,t+1 ≡ E[Rkt+1|FIji,t ].
E.2 Conjectures and out-of-equilibrium beliefs
I look for an equilibrium with the following properties.
1. Asset a has a higher expected excess return than asset b; that is, for all t,
Rˆat+1 > Rˆ
b
t+1. (E.3)
2. Asset a is purchased only by funds A, and asset b is purchased only by funds B. That is, for all t,
IAat = [0, α) and IBbt = [α, 1]. (E.4)
3. There exists a publicly known constant γa > 0 such that asset a’s price function is
P a
(
δˆIAt
)
=
δˆIAt
r
− γa where δˆIAt ≡
1
α
∫ α
0
δˆIAi,t di. (E.5)
4. There exists {γbt }∞t=0 > 0, which is nonstochastic and publicly known, such that asset b’s price
function is
P bt
(
δˆIBt
)
=
δˆIBt
r
− γbt where δˆIBt ≡
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
δˆIBi,t di. (E.6)
5. There exists {θBb∗t }∞t=0 > 0, which is nonstochastic and publicly known, such that, for all i ∈ IBbt ,
manager B-i optimally plays
θBbi,t = θ
Bb∗
t (E.7)
on the equilibrium path and also on off-the-equilibrium paths such that δˆIBi,t 6= δˆt.
I specify the following out-of-equilibrium belief of the opaque funds’ investors, which is the obvious
counterpart of (3.3) in Section 3.
If E[δ¯t|HIBi,t ] 6= δˆIBt then δˆIBi,t = E[δ¯t|HIBi,t ]. (E.8)
E.3 Optimizations: Transparent funds
First, for a given k ∈ {a, b} chosen by manager A-i, let us consider the decisions of investors A-i. As
in Section 2.1, XAi,t is determined by the investors’ indifference condition: E[y
A
i,t+1
∣∣FIAi,t ] = 1 + r, where
yAi,t+1 = R
k
t+1θ
Ak
i,t + (1 + r)− cXAi,t is the fund return per dollar of capital. Solving this condition for XAi,t
yields
XAi,t =
1
c
Rˆkt+1θ
Ak
i,t . (E.9)
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Observe that the investors’ expected excess return RˆIAki,t+1 is replaced with Rˆ
k
t+1 in (E.9) because they
always correctly infer Ht.
Second, consider manager A-i’s problem. For a given k ∈ {a, b}, what is his optimal choice of θAki,t ?
Because there is no scope for manipulating investor learning regardless of k, his problem is, in effect,
simply choosing θAki,t to maximize his period-t utility, taking into account that X
A
i,t responds to θ
Ak
i,t
according to (E.9). His optimal choice is
θAki,t =
φ
cκ
Rˆkt+1. (E.10)
From (E.9) and (E.10), the manager’s maximized period-t utility given Rˆkt+1 is
φXAi,t −
κ
2
θAk2i,t =
φ2
2c2κ
Rˆk2t+1, (E.11)
which is increasing in Rˆkt+1. Therefore, given that Rˆ
a
t+1 > Rˆ
b
t+1 (by conjecture (E.3)), it is optimal for
the manager to choose k = a.
E.4 Optimizations: Opaque funds
According to conjecture (E.4), it is optimal for each fund-B manager to choose k = b in every period.
In this section, I take it as given and characterize the opaque-fund agents’ optimal decisions. Later, in
Section E.6, I will verify that it is indeed optimal for the manager to choose k = b.
Using conjecture (E.7), the investors’ indifference condition implies that the size of fund B-i is
XBi,t =
1
c
RˆIBbi,t+1θ
Bb∗
t . (E.12)
This size depends on the investors’ belief (θBb∗t ) about the manager’s unobservable choice (θ
Bb
i,t ). Note
also that it depends on the investors’ expected excess return on asset b, RˆIBbi,t+1, which need not be equal
to Rˆbt+1 off the equilibrium path.
Following steps similar to those in Section 3.3, the manager’s problem is reduced to the following.
Lemma E.1. Suppose that manager B-i chooses k = b in period t. Then, he chooses θBbi,t ∈ [0,∞) to
maximize
−κ
2
θBb2i,t +
φ
c
(
θBbi,t − θBb∗t
θBb∗t
)
ΩtRˆ
b
t+1, (E.13)
where Ωt ≡ (1− λt+1)
∞∑
τ=1
βτθBb∗t+τ
(
1 +
1− λt+τ+1
r
)( t+τ∏
ν=t+2
λν
)
.
Proof of Lemma E.1: First, consider what happens when manager B-i deviates from his equilibrium play(
θBb∗0 , θ
Bb∗
1 , ...
)
and chooses an arbitrary sequence
(
θBki,0 , θ
Bk
i,1 , ...
)
. Note that here the manager is allowed
to choose k = a when deviating. If the manager chooses k = a in period t, then the investors will directly
observe δt+1. However, if the manager chooses k = b in period t, then, as discussed in Section 3.3, the
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investors’ inference about δt+1 can be misled. That is,
if i ∈ IBat , then δIBi,t+1 = δt+1;
if i ∈ IBbt , then δIBi,t+1 = δt+1 +
(
θBbi,t − θBb∗t
θBb∗t
)
Rbt+1.
Then, following steps similar to those in the proof of Lemma C.1, the size of fund B-i in period t = 1, 2, ...
is written as
XBi,t = X
B
t +X
B+
i,t , (E.14)
where
XBt ≡
1
c
Rˆbt+1θ
Bb∗
t
and
XB+i,t ≡
θBb∗t
c
(
1 +
1− λt+1
r
) t∑
s=1
(
t∏
ν=s+1
λν
)
(1− λs)1(i∈IBbs−1)
(
θBbi,s−1 − θBb∗s−1
θBb∗s−1
)
Rbs,
where 1(Z) is an indicator function that takes 1 if Z is true and 0 otherwise. The indicator function is
needed because the manager’s deviation in period s− 1 influences XB+i,t only if he chooses k = b in that
period.
Note that, from (E.14) and (E.4), the future fund size XBi,t+τ (τ = 1, 2, ...) is a linear function of
(θBki,0 , ..., θ
Bk
i,t+τ−1). It follows that the marginal effect of the manager’s current action θ
Bb
i,t on X
B
i,t+τ is
independent of his actions in other periods, (θBki,0 , ..., θ
Bk
i,t−1, θ
Bk
i,t+1, ..., θ
Bk
i,t+τ−1). So, by the same logic as
in the proof of Lemma 3.1, the manager’s objective function is simplified to (E.13). (End of proof of
Lemma E.1.)
The first term of (E.13) is the manager’s personal cost of choosing the portfolio, and the second term
corresponds to his expected gain from influencing future investor estimates. The optimal choice of θBbi,t
(given Rˆbt+1 and θ
Bb∗
t ) is
θBbi,t =
1
θBb∗t
φ
cκ
ΩtRˆ
b
t+1. (E.15)
It is shown in Section E.5 that Rˆbt+1 is nonstochastic. Hence, conjecture (E.7) is correct (and the investors’
beliefs are consistent) if θBbi,t = θ
Bb∗
t in (E.15)—that is, if
θBb∗t =
(
φ
cκ
ΩtRˆ
b
t+1
)1/2
. (E.16)
The values of θBb∗t and Rˆ
b
t+1 will be determined explicitly after the market-clearing condition is imposed
and another relation between θBb∗t and Rˆ
b
t+1 is identified (in Section E.5).
E.5 Equilibrium
According to conjecture (E.4) (which is verified later), asset a is purchased only by funds A and asset b
only by funds B. Plugging the fund-A agents’ optimal policies, (E.9) and (E.10), into asset a’s market-
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clearing condition (E.1) pins down the expected excess return on asset a: for all t,
Rˆat+1 = Rˆ
a ≡ c
(
piS
α
)1/3(
κ
φ
)2/3
. (E.17)
Substituting (E.17) into (E.9) and (E.10) determines the fund-A agents’ equilibrium actions. On the
other, plugging the fund-B agents’ optimal policies (E.12) and (E.15) into asset b’s market-clearing
condition (E.2), and noting that RˆIBbi,t+1 = Rˆ
b
t+1 holds for all i in equilibrium, we obtain the expected
excess return on asset b as
Rˆbt+1 = c
(
(1− pi)Sκ
(1− α)φΩt
)1/2
. (E.18)
Now the price P kt for k = a, b can be determined. Following the same steps as in Sections 2.3 and
3.4, conjectures (E.5) and (E.6) are correct if and only if
γa =
Rˆa
r
=
c
r
(
piS
α
)1/3(
κ
φ
)2/3
and γbt =
∞∑
τ=0
(
1
1 + r
)τ+1
Rˆbt+τ+1.
As in Section 3.4, it is readily shown that Ω∗ = ξθBb∗ in the stationary state when t →∞, where ξ
is given by (3.13). Using this relation, the stationary versions of (E.16) and (E.18) can be written as a
system of equations with two unknowns: Rˆb∗ and θBb∗. The solutions are
Rˆb∗ = c
(
(1− pi)S
1− α
)1/3(
κ
φξ
)2/3
(E.19)
and
θBb∗ =
(
(1− pi)Sφξ
(1− α)κ
)1/3
. (E.20)
From (E.17) and (E.19), conjecture (E.3) is correct (i.e., Rˆa > Rˆb∗ holds) if and only if
ξ > ξ` ≡
(
α
1− α
1− pi
pi
)1/2
. (E.21)
In other words, for this equilibrium to exist, the career concerns of fund-B managers need to be strong
enough to make them drive up asset b’s price to the level at which the fund-A managers invest only in
asset a. The parametric assumption ξ ∈ (ξ`, 2) ensures (E.21).
Substituting (E.17) and (E.19) into the agents’ optimal policies determines their equilibrium actions:
XA∗ =
(
piS
α
)2/3(
κ
φ
)1/3
and XB∗ = ξ4/3` ξ
−1/3XA∗;
θAa∗ =
(
piSφ
ακ
)1/3
and θBb∗ = ξ2/3` ξ
1/3θAa∗.
52
From these, the managers’ one-period utilities are determined as follows:
UMA∗ = φXA∗ − κ
2
θAa∗2 =
κ1/3
2
(
φpiS
α
)2/3
and
UMB∗ = φXB∗ − κ
2
θBb∗2 = ξ4/3` ξ
−1/3(2− ξ)UMA∗. (E.22)
Note that each fund-B manager attains a positive utility level (i.e., UMB∗ > 0) because ξ < 2 by
assumption. This fact ensures that fund-B managers optimally choose k = b, as formally shown in
Section E.6.
E.6 Verification of optimality
Last, we need to verify that it is indeed optimal for each fund-B manager to choose k = b in every period.
In this section, I show that the manager’s one-period utility level would be zero if he deviated from the
equilibrium strategy and chose k = a in an arbitrary period t. With this result, we can verify that k = b
is indeed optimal for him because we already know from (E.22) that k = b allows him to attain a positive
utility UMB∗ > 0.
Suppose that manager B-i chooses k = a in period t. First, consider the decisions of investors B-i.
Because they cannot observe the manager’s portfolio choice θBai,t , they make decisions based on their belief
about θBai,t , not on the actual θ
Ba
i,t . Let θ˜
Ba
i,t denote the investors’ belief about θ
Ba
i,t . Then the investors’
indifference condition implies that the size of fund B-i in period t is
XBi,t =
1
c
RˆIBai,t+1θ˜
Ba
i,t . (E.23)
Second, consider the manager’s portfolio choice. Because the investors will observe the true value of
δt+1 directly, there is no scope for the manager to influence investors’ future estimates by choosing θ
Ba
i,t .
So, in effect, the manager’s problem is static: he chooses θBai,t ∈ [0,∞) to maximize his period-t utility
φXBi,t −
κ
2
θBa2i,t , (E.24)
taking into account that XBi,t is determined according to (E.23). However, because the first term of
(E.24) is independent of the manager’s actual choice of θBai,t and thus it is out of his control, effectively
the manager’s problem is choosing θBai,t to minimize the cost κθ
Ba2
i,t /2 on the second term. Clearly, then,
for any belief θ˜Bai,t of the investors, the manager’s optimal choice is θ
Ba
i,t = 0.
The investors should rationally anticipate that the manager will choose θBai,t = 0. So their belief is
θ˜Bai,t = 0. Then (E.23) implies that the investors do not provide any capital in the fund, that is, X
B
i,t = 0.
Thus, given XBi,t = 0 and θ
Ba
i,t = 0, the manager’s maximized period-t utility is 0, as we wanted.
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F Proof of Proposition 4.2
Let ω ∈ (0, 1) be a (endogenous) fraction of funds A that purchase asset a; the rest of them purchase
asset b. As in the case of ξ > ξ`, all funds B buy asset b because a commitment problem prevents them
from buying asset a. In equilibrium, the market clearing conditions imply the following.
Asset a: ωαθAat X
A
t = piS. (F.1)
Asset b: (1− ω)αθAbt XAt + (1− α)θBbt XBt = (1− pi)S. (F.2)
Plugging the agents’ optimal policies (Eqs (E.9), (E.10), (E.12), and (E.15)) into (F.1) and (F.2) and
using the relation Ω∗ = ξθBb∗, the assets’ expected excess returns in the long-run stationary equilibrium
(given ω) are obtained as
Rˆa∗ = c
(
piS
ωα
)1/3(
κ
φ
)2/3
(F.3)
and
Rˆb∗ = c
(
(1− pi)S
(1− ω)α+ (1− α)ξ2
)1/3(
κ
φ
)2/3
. (F.4)
From (E.11), each fund-A manager’s maximized utility is increasing in Rˆk∗, k ∈ {a, b}. Thus, she is
indifferent between k = a and k = b if and only if Rˆa∗ = Rˆb∗. This equality pins down the equilibrium
value of ω, denoted by ω∗. Note that ω∗ ≤ 1 because ω∗ = 1 if ξ = ξ`, dω∗/dξ > 0, and ξ ≤ ξ`. Plugging
ω∗ back into (F.3) and (F.4) yields the value of Rˆ∗ = Rˆa∗ = Rˆb∗. Plugging Rˆ∗ into the agents’ optimal
policies yields their equilibrium actions. Note that all fund-A managers choose the same level of leverage
irrespective of whether k = a or k = b, that is, θA∗ = θAa∗ = θAb∗.
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